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1.1 Background of Research 
Different conflict resolution mechanisms have different effects. One of these, 
consociationalism, is the subject matter of this dissertation. Specifically the paper seeks 
to explore and investigate the consociational model as an applied political mechanism of 
generating cooperation in divided societies, with particular reference to Kenya, 2007 – 
2008. 
 
According to Kemenyi & Romero, in the post-independence period, up to but not 
including the 1990s, Kenya was a relatively peaceful country. “Kenya has remained fairly 
stable and peaceful during most of the post-independence period; violence between 
ethnic groups has tended to erupt around elections since the introduction of competitive 
multiparty politics”. (Kemenyi & Romero 2008: 3) The country’s relative tranquillity has 
been characterised by a stable political system and a well balanced economy, further, 
Kenya has for many years been regarded as a favourite tourist destination. However, 
Kemenyi and Romero do not take into account the oppression experienced by Kenyans 
under the regime of Daniel arap Moi, (1978-2001). 
 
One of the obvious results of the new authority of Moi, and of the Office of the 
President, over all aspects of political life, was the destruction of the National 
Assembly as an independent institution and therefore as a legitimizing tool for the 
state […] Kenyans believed they could change their leaders through political 
process […] After President Moi come into power, however, elections became 
expensive and subject to rigging (Throup and Hornsby 1998: 41).  
 
The early 1990s saw the expansion of ethnic violence in Kenya. “Specifically, the worst 
ethnic conflict since independence erupted mainly in the Rift Valley, Western, and to 
some extent, Nyanza Provinces of Kenya in the 1990s” (Nangulu-Auku 2007: 142). The 
ethnic conflict started during the term of President Daniel arap Moi, who was also 
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referred to as a ‘dictator’. The genesis of this conflict was to get rid of other members of 
ethnic groups who had political power for the purposes of excluding them from material 
and social resources. Moreover, since Kenya was a one-party state during President arap 
Moi’s term, the Moi administration tried all possible means of retaining economic and 
political benefits as the country was moving towards a multi-party system.  Specifically, 
 
Violent conflict between ethnic groups in Kenya since the advent of the multi-
party system in 1991 has been deliberately manipulated and instigated by 
President Daniel arap Moi and his inner circle in order to undermine attempts to 
create an atmosphere conducive to political pluralism (Kearney 1999: 152) 
 
The Kenyan ethnic conflict did not cease with the introduction of the multiparty system, 
instead there were outbreaks of violence in various parts of the country.  For example, in 
1992 approximately 2,000 people were killed in tribal conflict in the West of the country. 
In December 1992 Moi was re-elected in the multi-party elections. His party Kenya 
African National Union (KANU) won a majority of legislature seats. In 1997, after the 
death of Oginga Odinga, Kenya’s first Vice president, Moi won a further term in widely 
criticised elections. In 2001, ethnic conflict culminated in several violent clashes in 
Kenya. “In December, thousands flee and several people were killed in rent battles 
involving Nubian and Lou communities in Nairobi’s Kibera slum district” (BBC news 
online, 12 August 2009). Daniel arap Moi’s term of office was ended by the victory of 
Mwai Kibaki in December 2002. Kibaki won over KANU rival Uhuru Kenyatta, this 
ended KANU’s four decades in power.  
 
The most recent outbreak of violence in Kenya occurred in February 2008. The genesis 
of the violence was the contested nature of the presidential election of 27 December 
2007. The main protagonists were the incumbent, Mwai Kibaki, leader of The Party of 
National Unity (PNU), and Raila Odinga, leader of the (opposition) Orange Democratic 
Movement. Raila Odinga and his party believed that the elections were definitively 
flawed.  
 
Irregularities in the vote tallying process led to claims of fraud from opposition 
parties, with foreign and domestic observers casting doubt on the capacity and 
independence of the Electoral Commission. The announcement of Mwai Kibaki, 
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the incumbent president, as the winner of the presidential race on December 30 
triggered a wave of ethnic violence across Kenya. (Horowitz 2008) 
 
Rheault & Tortora (2008) further comment that “ Kenyans, along with the rest of the 
world, heard reports of irregularities during the electoral process, including vote-buying, 
ballot stuffing, and data tallying issues and delays reporting the results…”  Not only were 
election procedures flawed, but also ethnic tensions were exacerbated by the tendency of 
politicians to play the ethnic card.  
 
Kenya’s main ethnic groups include the Kamba, (11 % of the population), the Kalenjin 
(11%); the Kikuyu (20%); the Luhya (13%) and the Luo (14%). In combination, these 
major ethnic groups represent more than two-thirds of the national population in Kenya. 
The figure below illustrates the ethnic composition of Kenya. 
 
Figure 1 
Ethnic Composition of Kenya’s Provinces 
 




The two main contenders for presidential office largely drew their support from different 
ethnic groups.  
 
Kibaki was ‘drawing his support mainly from the Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru 
communities,’ while Odinga had the support of the ‘Luo, Luhya, Kalenjin, and 
some smaller ethnic communities.’ In light of the importance of ethnicity in the 
development of Kenyan politics, information about candidates' ethnic support is 
particularly relevant. (Rheault & Tortora, 2008) 
 
 As in other parts of the world, electoral systems in Africa often are characterised by 
‘identity politics’, and from the 1990s onwards, Kenya is no exception. According to Fish 
(quoted in Kemenyi & Romero 2008: 4), in specific relation to identity politics in Africa,  
 
You are practising identity politics when you vote for or against someone because 
of his or her skin colour, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or any 
marker that leads you to say yes or no independently of a candidate’s ideas or 
policies. In essence, identity politics is an affirmation of tribe against the claims 
of ideology…An identity politics voter says in effect, I don’t care what views he 
holds, or even what bad things he may have done, or what lack of ability he may 
display, he’s my kinsman, or he’s my landsman. 
 
The concept of ‘identity politics’ is reinforced by social identity theory. Korostelina 
(2007: 127) defines the theory as one that “accentuates the impact of status and self-
esteem on stereotypes, attitudes and prejudice and provides explanation of a person’s 
behaviour in situations of increasing status through the collective action or intergroup 
migration”. This definition is instructive in light of the findings of a Gallup poll 
conducted after Kenya’s 2008 elections. “The self-identified Kikuyu are the only group 
in which a majority (67%) say the presidential election was honest. No self-identified 
respondents such as Luo (1%), Luhya (3%), Kalenjin (12%), and Kamba (15%) believe 
the election was honest. Also, almost one in five Kamba (18%) do not have an opinion, 
which is by far the highest percentage of ‘don't knows’ among the top five ethnic 

















While the above survey by no means is extensive or conclusive, it nonetheless indicates a 
connection between identity politics and estimations of electoral failures, and thus 
illustrates (if only partially) an ethnicity problematic in the 2007 elections in Kenya. In 
this specific respect, it is noteworthy that “Much of Kenya’s post-election violence in 
2007 was characterized by inter-ethnic conflict which targeted thousands of people seen 
as either pro-government or pro-opposition”. (BBC news online, 28 February 2008) 
Further, the Mungiki, a group that claims to have originated from the Mau Mau rebellion 
against British colonial rule, surfaced during the 2007 election, and operated in support of 
the Kikuyu ethnic group, and hence of Kibaki. According to a BBC report  
 
Warring groups [were] divided down ethnic lines, and while I was covering the 
violence I saw gangs wearing tell-tale Mungiki emblems (red scarves and bits of 
scarlet cloth tied around forearms) on the rampage. Police behaviour, Mungiki 
violence and now the murder of two human rights activists call into question the 
rule of law in Kenya. Kenyan society is trying to heal itself after the inter-tribal 
violence (BBC news online, 6 March 2008). 
 
In the aftermath of the post-election violence, Kenya embarked on a conflict resolution 
process, during which the former Secretary General of the United Nation, Mr Kofi Annan 
acted as a mediator between the two rival presidential candidates. According to Horowitz,  
 
While the negotiations began with a wide gulf between the two sides, the adroit 
management of the lead mediator, Kofi Annan, produced an accord in March 
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2008. The main provision of the agreement was that a Grand Coalition 
government would be created in which the two parties would share power 
(Horowitz 2008). 
 
The power-sharing agreement between Raila Odinga and Kibaki meant that there would 
be a creation of a prime minister post and government’s top positions were to be shared 
between Odinga’s party and Kibaki’s. 
 
The agreement calls for an act of parliament within two weeks that would change 
the country's constitution, creating the position of prime minister to "coordinate 
and supervise" the government and its ministries. Odinga will assume that 
position. The National Accord and Reconciliation Act 2008 establishes that the 
president, vice president, prime minister and other ministers will form the 
government's cabinet -- with the addition of two deputy prime ministers who will 
be appointed by the president (CNN online, 28 February 2008) 
 
The new power-sharing agreement, according to Kofi Annan, is known as the National 
Accord and Reconciliation Act and is entrenched in Kenya’s constitution today.  
As can be seen from the background to the 2007-2008 conflict in Kenya, two main 
features have been highlighted: an ethnic dimension to the conflict, and a power sharing 
formula intrinsic to the process of resolution. Since both these features fit the parameters 
of a consociational model of conflict resolution, this study’s primary research problem is 
to analyse the extent to which a consociational formula has been applied in Kenya, as 
well as to interrogate the outcome of Kenya’s conflict resolution effort with close 
reference to the literature on consociationalism.  
 
1.2 Theoretical Framework  
This study is guided by the consociational perspective as a theoretical framework. Within 
this broad framework, the project is guided by explanatory and predictive theories 
respectively. The explanatory theory determines relationships among the dimensions of 
the phenomena. It identifies how the properties and components relate to each other. The 
predictive theory carries with it a prediction of the relationship between the 
characteristics of phenomena (in this case having as the phenomena the application of 
consociationalism in Kenya). 
 
  7
The theory of consociationalism dates from the 1970s with the work of Arend Lijphart, 
Eric Nordlinger, Gerhard Lehmbruch and others; “it is also often called consociational 
democracy, consensus democracy, corporatism or proportional democracy” 
(Schneckerner 2002: 203). Managing and regulating conflict in conflict-prone countries 
is not only a priority to that country per se but rather it ends up being an international 
issue. This is because in one way or another, the conflict directly or indirectly affects 
neighbouring countries and regions. Consociational theory tends to focus on ethnic 
conflict which has claimed many lives in many regions of the world. For example, in 
Rwanda “At least half a million people perished in the Rwandan genocide […] Perhaps 
as many as three quarters of the Tutsi population, at the same time, thousands of Hutu 
were slain because they opposed the killing campaign and the forces directing it.” (Shah 
Anup 2006). It is notable that these deaths took place in the space of one year (1994). 
 
Granted, Kenya between 2007-2008 cannot be included in the category of widespread 
‘ethnic cleansing’.  Firstly, the scale of deaths and injuries do not warrant the term 
‘genocide’. Secondly, there is no simple or overwhelming ‘ethnic connection’. However, 
this study argues that the scale of violence – inflicted deaths and injuries warrant closer 
investigation, as does the presence of (following Afolayan’s definition of tribalism: see 
Chapter 2)) tribalism as a contributing factor. The latter, in particular, suggests that 
application of a consociational model of conflict resolution in Kenya is – in theory, at 
least – apposite. The Waki Report (2008:305) acknowledges the multiple causes of post- 
election violence in Kenya. “The multiple-cause-of-death information from 1,133 deaths 
was in respect of the period between 27th December 2007 and 29th February 2008 … 
[T]he Commission relied upon information provided by respective hospitals in the five 
provinces under inquiry”. These were: Western, Rift Valley, Nyanza, Nairobi and Coast. 
Furthermore, “The Kiliku Report which also investigated ethnic clashes in 1992 
documented 779 deaths and 654 injuries in the districts that were the subject of the 
inquiry” (Waki 2008: 304).  Below are figures 2 and 3 showing respectively the number 






Source: (Waki Report 2008:335) 
Figure 4 
 
Source: (Waki Report 2008:309) 
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It should also be noted that the above figures do not reflect unreported deaths and 
injuries, but only those that were officially reported. As stated in the Waki Report (2008: 
306) “While Commission has tried to establish the true extent of deaths and injuries we 
recognize that for various reasons not all deaths that occurred as a result of the post 
election violence may have been captured for various reasons”. Some of the reasons are 
as follows: 
a) Some deaths may not have been reported to the hospitals or to police stations due to 
the prevailing security concerns situation at the time. 
b) In many cases those who were injured did not report to hospital or health centers for 
fear of their safety or because in the ordinary scheme of things the injuries were 
considered minor compared to other problems being experienced at the time; 
c) In some cases injuries were not properly documented due to the fact that hospitals 
were understaffed and supply of drugs and other medical supplies were disrupted 
d) In some instances, patient referrals were problematic as some roads were blocked 
paralyzing efficiency in documentation of injuries and violence.  
e) Injured persons may have sought alternative medical attention, for example, through 
traditional healers or unlicensed practitioners. (Waki Report 2008:306). 
 
The disputes in the Rift Valley have been mainly between the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin 
who dominate much of the region. “The clashes over land involve class and wealth as 
much as ethnicity. Many poor Kikuyu and Kalenjin farmers alike have had their 
livelihoods destroyed by land-grabbing elite politicians” (African Continental 2008:8). 
It is noteworthy that the Rift Valley is the Kalenjin based stronghold of the ODM party 
which is Kenya’s main opposition party led by Raila Odinga.  The Kalenjin together with 
the Lou, the Luhya and some other smaller ethnic communities supported Odinga, 
whereas the Kikuyu supported Kibaki. According to Rice (2008). 
 
Looters used iron bars to smash the windows of shops belonging to non-Kikuyu 
businesspeople, and made off with television sets, groceries and clothing. ..[A]nd 
in the northern Rift valley, which saw the worst of the ethnic violence 
immediately after the election, gangs of Kalenjin warriors continue to cause 
havoc. On Saturday, for the second time in a week, hundreds of youths attacked a 
monastery in Kipkelion where more than 600 Kikuyus and Kisiis are sheltering.  
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According to Gentlemen (2008) 
 
In the Rift Valley, local elders organized young men to raid Kikuyu areas and kill 
people in a bid to drive the Kikuyus off their land. It worked, for the most part, 
and over the past month, tens of thousands of Kikuyus have fled. More than 650 
people, many of them Kikuyus, have been killed. Many of the attackers are 
widely believed to be members of the Luo and Kalenjin ethnic groups. 
 
In a nutshell, then, ethnic hostilities in combination with other factors such as poverty and 
disputes over land, contributed significantly to outbreaks of violence, particularity in the 
Rift Valley.  
 
1.3 Research Design 
From the two types of research design, empirical study and non-empirical study, the 
study will use the non empirical one; this includes philosophical analysis, conceptual 
analysis and theory building. According to Mouton, “empirical studies are observational 
or experimental rather than theoretical, whereas non empirical studies are based on 
theory” (Mouton 2004: 57). 
 
1.4 Research Methods 
This is a theoretical, qualitative and literature based study. As indicated by the literature 
review, there are numerous sources available on consociational theory, and there is an 
adequate basis in the literature from which to draw an analysis of the theory’s application 
to conflict in Africa and elsewhere. 
 
In the matter of researching consociational elements in Kenya’s power-sharing 
agreement, this study to some extent breaks new ground. In this regard, the study will 
deploy a comparative approach; this means that Kenya shall be compared with countries 
such as a Lebanon, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The study will also 





1.5 The Structure Of The Dissertation 
This study is a critical exploration of Kenya’s power-sharing agreement between the 
period of 2007 and 2008. Following the introductory chapter, the dissertation is 
structured in five chapters. The second chapter broadly explains consociationalism, 
looking both to its origin as a different school of thought and as a theory; the chapter 
shall further highlight the key elements of the theory and the conditions that favours its 
application. The third chapter focuses on Kenya as a case study. It highlights the era of 
Kenya’s multiparty elections (1990 -2006). The fourth chapter focuses on Kenya’s 
Power-sharing agreement of 2007-2008 and the consociational elements in Kenya’s 
democracy.  
 
Chapter five argues that Kenyan elite play a significant role in Kenya’s democracy and 
that if Kenya’s ruling elite honors the consociational commitment to segmental autonomy 
(in the form of devolving power to the 47 regions) it will be a significant step towards 
social and political stability. The study concludes that one key aspect of the 2008 power-
sharing agreement (subsequently embedded in the constitution of 2010) qualifies as 














THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW: ETHNICITY AND 
CONSOCIATIONALISM. 
 
As a review of the literature reveals, ‘consociationalism’ is a contested concept and, like 
many other terms, is subject to a variety of interpretations. Dixon (2005: 358) contends 
that “while all text is open to interpretation, consociationalism, for all its ‘scientific’ 
claims, is particularly difficult to underpin”. Further, Jastad takes exception to the notion 
that ‘power sharing’ and ‘consociationalism’ are coterminous and points out that separate 
strands of research have used the term ‘power-sharing’ in different ways: Firstly, power 
sharing in terms of democracy, secondly, power-sharing in terms of conflict management. 
She argues that 
 
Conceptual confusion has hampered research on power sharing. Two, actually 
separate strands of research use the term ‘power sharing’, often without 
recognising the difference in terms of democracy and conflict management. 
However, power sharing stipulated in part of the conflict management literature 
differs from power sharing in accordance with democratic theory. Because of 
different definitions, there is little overlap between the characteristics, the cases 
and the mechanisms of these two concepts of power sharing (Jastad 2006: 14) 
 
One way of understanding power sharing is in terms of conflict management. The main 
function of power-sharing in this discourse is to end violence and not necessarily to build 
democracy. “Power sharing serves as the mechanism that offers this protection by 
guaranteeing all groups a share of state power. By dividing and balancing power among 
rival groups, power-sharing institutions minimize the danger of any one party becoming 
dominant and threatening the security of others” (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003 :319). 
However, the claim that power sharing intends to end violence but not necessarily build 
democracy, does not automatically mean that power sharing and democracy are not 
compatible. It simply means that less emphasis is put on democratic representation and 
election when efforts are made to implement power sharing. Spears (2000:105) contend 
that “power-sharing does not have to mean that democratic principles and procedures 
must be abandoned; indeed, power-sharing arrangements can be compatible with 
democracy while diminishing its most destabilizing side effects”. 
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Another way of understanding power sharing is by viewing it as a mechanism for making 
democracy work in societies divided along ethnic lines. This is where Arend Lijphart’s 
theory of consociationalism comes in. “Consociational democracy means government by 
an elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a 
stable democracy”. (Lijphart 1969:216) One of the main functions of any democracy is to 
ensure the equality of citizens so as to avoid potential disputes arising from inequalities. 
Dlamini (2008:12) states that “democracies seek to manage conflicting interest by 
allowing the people to compete according to agreed upon rules, mediated by institutions”.  
 
It thus seems evident that power sharing and consociationalism share one common 
essence, and that is, they both seek to regulate and minimize conflict in multi-cultural or 
multi-ethnic societies. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, ‘power-sharing’ in Kenya 
will be examined with reference to mainstream consociational literature as exemplified 
by scholars such as Lijphart (1990;1977), Eisenburg (2002), Uzodike (2004), and 
Lemarchand (2006), among others. Given the recent nature of 2007-2008 conflict in 
Kenya, and the subsequent application of a power-sharing formula in 2008, much of the 
available literature is electronic but includes – particularly in regard to the ethnic 
dimension – scholars such as Housdale, (2008), Ong’ayo (2008) and Prunier (2008).  
 
2.1 Defining ‘Ethnicity’. 
The study argues that, identity politics in the form of ethnicity is sufficiently significant 
in the Kenyan context to warrant investigation. As Kearney (1999: 50-51) puts it:  
 
The mere existence of different ethnic groups is not necessarily cause for concern, 
in fact it merely adds to the richness and diversity of human cultures; but what is 
problematic is the manipulation of ethnic identities for political reasons, in which 
case ethnic loyalties and differences are used by politicians to ensure their 
continued dominance, (if they are from a ruling regime) or attempt to win the 
means by which they may dominate (if they are from opposition)…. 
Prunier argues that what best explains the post election violence in Kenya is by reference 
to the evolution of its ethno-political mosaic since independence. By this he means that 
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the historical experiences of Kenya’s different leaders is the best way in which one can 
understand the post - election violence in Kenya. For example he states that 
 
In Kenyatta's time the deal was simple: the Kikuyu and their smaller relatives, 
after making an agreement with the minority tribes, ran everything. The Luo, who 
eventually tried to challenge this ordering, were forcefully marginalized as the 
prudent Luhya looked on. After Kenyatta died in 1978, his vice-president Daniel 
Arap Moi - who was from the Kalenjin minority tribe - inherited the mantle of 
power on the understanding that he would not upset the arrangement designed to 
keep the two other large tribes (and particularly the Luo) out of power. (Prunier 
2008: 2) 
 
In short, ethnic patterns of inclusion and exclusion have been a feature of Kenyan politics 
since independence, and have contributed to conflict. Successive Kenyan leaders have 
been implicated in this conflict. As Esman (1989:55) argues  
 
One function of leadership is to establish and propagate the goals of the ethnic 
movement […] Much of the energy of ethnic group leaders must often be 
committed to managing and conciliating these internal tension and conflicts in 
order to maintain control of their constituency and to battling opponents within 
the ethnic community. 
 
Moreover, in light of conflict issues in Africa, not least the ethnicity problematic, the 
majoritarian model of democracy is not necessarily Africa’s best option. For example, 
Uzodike argues that “the idea of power sharing or consociational democracy appears to 
be a potentially useful phenomenon in addressing Africa’s societal segmentation and the 
challenges it poses towards continental development” (Uzodike 2004: 288). His position 
is that what provides the wrong context for majoritarian experiments in democracy is the 
resource – starved African social and political environment. “The winner takes all format 
of majoritarianism is precisely why tensions have remained rife within African states 
despite the introduction of political liberalization and democratic politics” (Uzodike 
2004:288) 
 
Similarly, Lumumba-Kasango contends that “while Africa is promoting liberal 
democracy as the most promising formula for unleashing individual energy and 
generating political participation, Africa’s social and economic conditions are 
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worsening”. (2005: 5). In short, emerging instances of conflict and past experiences have 
brought evidence that the majoritarian model is not necessarily the best system for 
resolving internal differences, and that consociational democracy may be a viable 
alternative. 
 
While ethnic divisions might appear to be the main contributing factor to conflict in 
African countries, there are other factors that need to be taken into consideration when 
analyzing conflict in African societies. In some instances, ethnicity has been confused 
with class struggle as the cause of conflict; in others, class struggle has been confused 
with ethnicity. Highlighting some of the major political problems in Kenya, Kearney 
contends that  
 
There are also elements of ‘class conflict’ here, whereby for example richer 
farmers, or businessmen working in the village, will be quite content to exploit 
the humble villager in their own ‘capitalist’ interests. It should also be 
remembered that capitalism has penetrated these rural areas to some extent and 
that even here, Western influences cannot be denied. (Kearney 1999: 275)  
 
 Moreover, As Gordon (1995: 890) puts it, “[T]he ideology of appeals to custom and 
ethnic solidarity becomes a disguised form of class struggle as the poor and 
disadvantaged ethnic groups struggle against class closure among the wealthy elite”.  
 
 Conflict could be an outcome of both ethnic disputes and class struggle. In the Kenyan 
case for example, the existence of many different ethnic groups does not necessarily 
mean that conflict will be caused by ethnic clashes, but other factors are likely to play a 
role in this regard. For example, Gordon (1995:894) argues that “The conflict between 
the Lou and the Kikuyu cannot be reduced to tribalism, however. These conflicts have 
been largely the result of the differential impact of underdeveloped capitalism and class 
formation on the Lou and Kikuyu”.  
  
Further, as Alwy and Schech point out, Kenya’s different ethnic groups were exposed to 
different opportunities and privileges during and after Kenya gained independence in 
1963. This created class hierarchies which in turn brought inequality in education, 
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business and other demarcating factors. “The colonial legacy in Africa created uneven 
development in agrarian commercialization, transport investment and educational 
opportunities, and thus the allocation of an ethnic group’s home territory determined its 
access to public goods such as education”. (Alwy and Schec 2004: 267). Thus while the 
research largely is limited to the ethnic base of conflict, the dissertation does not posit 
that class formations and struggle do not play a role in the construction of conflict in 
African societies. 
 
That said, it is arguable that ethnic consideration often outweigh economic class interests. 
For instance Mazrui distinguishes between socio-cultural and socio-economic ideologies 
in Africa. He includes ethnicity in the former category, and posits that “when the 
grassroots have been able to express ideological preferences, it has been socio-cultural 
ideologies that have exerted greater influence” (Mazrui 2000: 97) By way of illustration, 
Mazrui cites the example of Nigeria and Kenya. 
 
The manifestation of the tribal tradition in African political culture is either 
through the oral tradition or through the political behavior of African societies, in 
spite of alien postcolonial constitutions. The preference of kinship solidarity as 
against theoretical ideology has manifested itself behaviorally in many African 
elections. The late chief Obafemi Awolowo in Nigeria was sometimes the most 
prominent voice of the left in his country. He articulated socialist rhetoric, trying 
to reach the disadvantaged of Nigeria regardless of ethnic origin. But whenever an 
election took place, and the chief looked to see who was following him, he 
discovered that his followers were almost invariably fellow Yoruba regardless of 
social class, rather than the disadvantaged of Nigeria, regardless of ethnic origin. 
In East Africa, Oginga Odinga was the Awolowo of Kenya. Again, he often 
articulated the rhetoric of the left in Kenya. But apart from a few intellectuals and 
academics, those who responded to Odinga’s trumpet-call were not the 
disadvantaged of Kenya regardless of ethnic group but rather Oginga Odinga’s 
ethnic compatriots, the Luo, regardless of social class. What this evidence reveals 
is the preference of the electorate in countries like Nigeria and Kenya for concrete 
kinship solidarity as against ideological theory, a preference for shared sacred 
ancestry as against commitment to radical change. The conservative tradition in 
Africa is thus manifested and expressed behaviorally, rather than in written texts. 
[…] the ethnicist tradition in Africa tends to have invisible authors, a body of 
thought without attribution to specific individual thinkers. Ethnicism and tribality 
tend to be collective political culture rather than a theoretical masterpiece from 
one individual mind. Tribality is captured in the accumulation of specific attitudes 
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across generations rather than in a specific text from a particular pen. (Mazrui 
2000:101-102) 
 
Mazrui concludes that in countries like Nigeria and Kenya, the electorate tends to favor 
“concrete kinship solidarity” (Mazrui 2000:102). He notes that grassroots preference can 
be put to instrumental use by politicians in the struggle over scarce resources – indeed, in 
some cases “the whole market can be cornered or monopolized by an ethnic 
group”(Mazrui 2000:115). Mazrui defines this phenomenon as “ethnic nepotism”.  
Mazrui tends to use the concept of tribalism and ethnicity interchangeably. However, as 
Piper suggests, ‘ethnicity’ is a more neutral concept. 
 
“[T]he ‘objective’ aspects of ethnic identity do not constitute the fundamental criterion 
for membership of the ethnic group at all, but are understood as indicae of this 
membership” (Piper 1998: 39). ‘Tribalism’, on the other hand, often is used pejoratively. 
The concept contains negative connotations derived from the colonial era. For instance, 
as Kearney notes “modern African politicians have and do use the words tribe and 
tribalism to describe other ethnic groups whom they perceive as threatening” (Kearney 
1999:49). 
 
Leys (cited in Kearney 1999:49) argues that “tribalism consist in the fact that people 
identify other exploited people as the source of their insecurity and frustrations, rather 
than their common exploiters...he thus posits a direct link between economic misfortune 
and ethnic revival (tribalism) in the African context”. By contrast, Piper (1998:40) 
defines ethnicity as “a sense of people-hood, or community by virtue of perceived 
common descent, as indicated by shared cultural endowments”. According to Afolayan 
(1997: 50-51), “the word tribalism is a “catch-all” term. The phenomenon rears its head 
in almost every sphere. It is associated with corruption, class formation, nepotism and the 
sociopolitical malaise bedeviling the nation. The failure of nation building and integration 
has most often been explained through reference to the pernicious evils of tribalism”. 
Afolayan further acknowledges that ethnic nationalism and tribalism are conterminous 
and that it may be often difficult to differentiate the two. Nevertheless, he makes a 
distinction between the two concepts by stating that:   
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Ethnic nationalism can be a positive commitment to the advancement of the 
interest of one’s ethnic group without prejudice to the interest of others. But in its 
negative and extreme form it can become tribalism. Tribalism can be described as 
a kind of morbid loyalty and commitment to one’s ethnic group to the exclusion, 
prejudice and often at the expense of other ethnic groups. It is usually inward 
looking, ethnocentric, and parochial in its exclusiveness. The ultimate objective is 
the survival, aggrandizement and supremacy of one’s ethnic group, usually to the 
detriment of other groups. In its strategies it entails the appeal to and mobilization 
of ethnic consciousness and the use of ethnic favors and preferences, as well as 
nepotism and corruption. (Afolayan 1997: 50-51) 
 
Thus, for the purposes of the study Mazrui and Afolayan’s definitions of ethnicity shall 
be adopted. Mazrui’s definition of ethnicity takes into account the preference of the 
electorate for “concrete kinship solidarity” rather than ideological theory which mean 
ethnicity is not viewed as commitment to radical change but instead as a preference for 
communal origin. And Afolayan’s definition embraces ‘ethnic nationalism’ as a positive 
obligation in advancing the interests of one’s ethnic group without prejudice to the 
interest of other but which may be referred to as ‘tribalism’ in its extreme form it may be 
detrimental to other ethnic groups. These two definitions are adopted because they are the 
most relevant in the Kenyan case as they bring sense to the actual role of ethnicity in 
Kenyan politics.  
 
Having highlighted the extent in which both ‘consociationalism’ and ‘ethnicity’ are 
contested concept, the chapter now investigates the origins of consociational theory.  
 
2.2 Origins Of Consociational Theory  
Even though consociational theory is well known to be associated with Arend Lijphart, 
(regarded as the ‘father of consociationalism’), the term ‘consociation’ has its own deep 
historical origin. The term ‘consociatio’ was first used by Johennes Althusius in 1603. He 
used this term to denote a form of political union. However, it was in the1960s that the 
term received its current meaning “when it was utilised by scholars concerned with a 
number of small democracies that challenged predominant plural and social determinist 
accounts of the relationship between political cleavages and democratic stability”. 
(Clarke & Foweraker 2001: 92). This means that consociationalism was not a common 
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concept until its development in the 1960s. As Bogaards (1998: 475) states “In the late 
sixties Arend Lijphart (1968, 1969, 1975a) introduced the model of consociational 
democracy to explain political instability in plural societies” A plural society being a 
society divided by what Harry Eckstein calls “segmental cleavages”. (Lijphart 1977:3) 
Lijphart presented elite behaviour as the missing link between a plural society and 
political stability. 
 
In explaining the cases of Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland, three broad 
approaches emerged in the early literature on consociationalism. “The application of 
consociationalism specifically was intended to explain the “paradoxical combination of a 
fragmented political subculture and democratic stability”. (Clarke & Foweraker 2001: 
92). Val Lorwin exemplified the first approach which 
 
Suggests the immobilistic potential of mutually hostile subcultures can be 
effectively countered by ‘segmented pluralism’: a degree of vertical sub-cultural 
encapsulation and autonomy sufficient to minimise the opportunity for conflict 
between subcultures. The second (Associated with Hans Dealder, Gerhard 
Lehmbruch and Jurg Steiner) argues that these countries’ capacity to maintain 
stable democracy is a product of their tradition of decision making, characterised 
for centuries by the principle of ‘amicable agreement’ and proportionality. 
(Clarke & Foweraker 2001:92) 
 
Arend Lijphart is mostly associated with the third approach.  His early works focused on 
a typology of democracy based on two major factors, namely, that their political cultures 
are homogeneous or fragmented and secondly, and that their elite behaviour is 
competitive. The term ‘consociational’ was therefore a term used by Lijphart to refer to 
those democracies “where fragmented political culture co-exists with accommodative 
elite behaviour, which builds a metaphorical bridge (or ‘arch’ over the gulf separating the 
subcultures (or ‘pillars’) and this ensures democratic stability”. (Lijphart cited in Clarke 
& Foweraker 2001:92). It is worth noting that only in systems where subcultures’ leaders 
realize the dangers of not cooperating is consociational democracy viable. 
“Consociational democracy entails the cooperation by segmental leaders in spite of the 
deep cleavages separating the segments. This requires that the leaders feel at least some 
commitment to the maintenance of the unity of the country as well as a commitment to 
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democratic principles”. (Lijphart 1977: 53) By retaining and maintaining the support and 
loyalty of their followers, the leaders must at the same time put forward the spirit of 
working together and compromise with leaders of other segments.  The term ‘followers’, 
according to Lijphart, “refers more specifically to the middle-level group that can be 
described as sub-elite political activist” (Lijphart 1977: 53)  
 
Lijphart attributes this to a strategy of ‘prudent leadership’ by rival sub-cultural 
elites facing the potential collapse of a political system and maintains that 
Consociational democracy is only viable if sub-cultural leaders have the ability to 
recognize the dangers inherent in fragmentation; commitment to system 
maintenance; the ability to transcended sub-cultural cleavage at the elite level and 
the ability to forge appropriate solutions for sub-cultural demands (Clarke & 
Foweraker 2001:92). 
 
2.3 Key Characteristics of Consociationalism 
The term ‘consociational’ is closely associated with power-sharing and consensus 
democracy. As Lijphart (1977) in Taylor, (2006: 217) puts it: 
 
Consociationalism holds that ‘deeply divided’ societies can become democratic 
through pragmatically driven elite-level bargaining for a form of executive power-
sharing in which the autonomy of contending groups is constitutionally 
guaranteed and protected through mutual veto rights, and where there is strong 
respect for principles of proportionality in elections, civil service appointments 
and government subsidies. 
 
This is because consociational ‘power-sharing’ and consensus democracy were 
frequently regarded as acceptable alternatives to the adversarial politics and the 
majoritarianism of the Westminster model. As Taylor (1992:1) puts it  
 
Since the initial formulation in the late 1960s consociationalism has led to a 
highly influential school of studies and consociational engineers have been 
marketed, particularly by Lijphart, as a genuinely attractive option to address the 
seemingly intractable ethnic divisions […]. Mainly, it is argued, because unlike 
the ‘British’ Westminster model of democracy, consociationalism does not result 
in the permanent exclusion of minority interest from government.  
As a result, consociational theory was frequently prescribed for countries with acute sub-
cultural diversity such as South Africa and Northern Ireland. According to Lijphart,   
“The majoritarian model holds that majority rule comes closer to the democratic ideal 
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than a government responsive to a minority. However, the consensus model argues that 
majority rule and the government vs. opposition pattern of administration may be 
inequitable because it is exclusionary”. In his analysis, Lijphart shows that only in 
homogenous countries can the majoritarian model of democracy be stable and this is 
because destructive competition is prevented when full power is allocated to the majority 
party. In short “consociationalism violates the principle of majority rule, but it does not 
deviate very much from the normative democratic theory” (Lijphart 1969: 214)  
 
Moreover, consociational democracy is suitable in heterogeneous countries where 
societies are divided along religious; ideological, linguistic, cultural, ethnic or racial 
lines. Lijphart argues that “social homogeneity and political consensus are regarded as 
prerequisites for, or factors strongly conducive too, stable democracy. Conversely, the 
deep social divisions and political differences within plural societies are held responsible 
for instability and breakdown in democracies”. (Lijphart 1977: 1) It is emphasized that  
“for many of the plural societies of the non-Western world, therefore, the realistic choice 
is not between the British normative model of democracy and the consociational model, 
but between consociational democracy and no democracy at all” (Lijphart 1977: 238). 
 
Consociationalism can be understood in two interconnected ways: as a (democratic) 
political system and as a political mechanism for conflict resolution. According to 
Lemarchand (following Lijphart) “Consociationalism has a very specific meaning; it 
means a great deal more than the mere inclusion of representatives of minority groups in 
institutions of government. There is, to be sure, the notion of elite cooperation through a 
grand coalition cabinet, where executive power is shared by opposition and majority 
parties”. (Lemarchand 2006:3) The sharing of executive powers – mutatis mutandis - has 
been regarded by some scholars as one of the most important elements of 
consociationalism. This sharing takes the form of a grand coalition of the political leaders 
of all significant social elements. (Lijphart 1977:25)  
Other fundaments of consociationalism are: mutual or minority veto, which is regarded as 
the minority’s ultimate weapon which helps them to protect their vital interests. 
According to Lemarchand (2006:3) “this works best when it is not used too often and 
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only with regard to issues of fundamental importance”. Lemarchand also cites 
proportional representation, which he defines as the basic standard of political 
representation, public service appointments and allocation of public funds. As such, he 
argues, it serves as a guarantee for the fair representation of ethnic minorities. The last 
condition of consociationalism cited by Lemarchand is segmented or group autonomy. 
This means that “while on issues of common interest decisions are made jointly by all 
members of the coalition cabinet, on all other issues autonomy is the rule, with each 
community free to attend to its own affairs as it wishes” (Lemarchand 2006:3). With this 
condition, minority groups are given the right to protect their own interests. As Eisenberg 
puts it, “Segmental autonomy or limited forms of self-government provides each minority 
with the security it needs to ensure that its distinctive interests are protected and 
minimizes the degree to which it must coordinate, compromise and negotiate with other 
minorities” (Eisenberg 2002:8) 
 
McGarry and O’Leary outline key elements of consociationalism by stating that 
“Consociations can be both democratic and authoritarian, but complete consociational 
democracies respect four organizational principles”. They summarise these principles as 
follows: 
1) Executive power-sharing (EPS). Each of the main communities share in executive 
power, in an executive chosen in accordance with the principles of representative 
government. 
2) Autonomy or self-government. Each enjoys some distinct measure of autonomy, 
particularly self-government in matters of cultural concern. 
3) Proportionality. Each is represented proportionally in key public institutions and 
is a proportional beneficiary of public resources and expenditures. 
4) Veto-rights. Each is able to prevent changes that adversely affect their vital 
interest. 
(2006:43-44) 
To sum up: 
Consociationalism is a mechanism for making democracy work in societies divided along 
ethnic lines. “Consociational democracy means government by an elite cartel designed to 
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turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy” (Lijphart, 
1969: 216). One of the main functions of any democracy is to ensure the equality of 
citizens so as to avoid potential disputes arising from inequalities. Dlamini (2008: 12) 
states that “democracies seek to manage conflicting interest by allowing the people to 
compete according to agreed upon rules, mediated by institutions”. Therefore, 
consociationalism in this sense is concerned with the consolidation of peace, stability and 
equality of the citizenry in unstable democracies. Since no political system of 
government is perfect, even the hegemonic ‘liberal democracy’ has manifest drawbacks. 
Consociational democracy therefore seeks to address these problems through devices of 
accommodation.  
 
In its capacity as a conflict resolution formula, consociationalism is sometimes regarded 
as synonymous with ‘power sharing’, and often is applied in countries where conflict is 
generated by social, cultural and ethnic differences. As Hoddie and Hartzel (2003:306) 
put it “The unambiguous intent behind the creation of power-sharing and power dividing 
institutions is to limit the capacity of any one party to the conflict to dominate the 
postwar state and use its advantaged position to harm the interests or survival of its 
rivals.” Further, Jastad takes exception to the notion that ‘power sharing’ and 
‘consociationalism’ are conterminous, and points out that separate strands of research 
have used the term ‘power-sharing’ in different ways: Firstly, power sharing in terms of 
democracy, secondly, power-sharing in terms of conflict management.  
 
One way of understanding consociational theory is by viewing it in terms of conflict 
management. “Power sharing serves as the mechanism that offers this protection by 
guaranteeing all groups a share of state power. By dividing and balancing power among 
rival groups, power-sharing institutions minimize the danger of any one party becoming 
dominant and threatening the security of others” (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003 :319). 
However, the claim that power sharing intends to end violence but not necessarily build 
democracy, does not automatically mean that power sharing and democracy are not 
compatible. It simply means that less emphasis is put on democratic representation and 
election when efforts are made to implement power sharing. Spears, (2000: 105) contends 
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that “power-sharing does not have to mean that democratic principles and procedures 
must be abandoned; indeed, power-sharing arrangements can be compatible with 
democracy while diminishing its most destabilizing side effects”. The aim of 
consociationalism as a conflict resolution mechanism is to instill and emphasize the 
importance of incorporation. “…the aim is to bring about a major restructuring of power 
relations through a more inclusive participation in policy making, accompanied by 
corresponding spheres of autonomy for the groups concerned. Incorporation than 
exclusion is seen as key to conflict resolution” (Lemarchand 2006:2) 
 
2.4 Conditions Conducive To The Application Of Consociational Schema  
Consociational democracy is a model that is both empirical and normative. “As an 
empirical model it is seen to explain democratic political stability in Austria, Belgium, 
Holland and Switzerland, whilst, as a normative model, its chances of success in plural 
societies are related to a constellation of nine favourable factors” (Taylor 1992:1). 
According to Lijphart, there are ‘seven’ favourable conditions of consociationalism. 
However, “these factors are helpful but neither indispensable nor sufficient in and of 
themselves to account for the success of consociational democracy” (Lijphart 1977: 54). 
Two issues are worth noting about these favourable factors. Firstly, originally, these 
favourable factors are not derived deductively from consociational theory but instead 
they have been inductively derived from the experience in consociational democracies. 
Bogaard (1998:476) states that  
 
To assess the factors that are conducive to consociational democracy in an 
inductive way, the experiences of more than one country need to be compared. 
This is why the favorable factors make their first appearance in Lijphart’s (1968, 
1969) comparative work, not in a country study. From then on, the favorable 
factors occupy a prominent place in Lijphart’s work on consociationalism; indeed, 
in his three earliest major comparative publications (Lijphart 1968, 1969, 1977) 
favorable factors take up more space than the characteristics of consociational 
democracy. 
 
Jurg Steiner has criticized these favorable factors for their ‘ad hoc’ character. For 
example, Steiner does not dispute the relevance of these favorable factors but states that 
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the rationales for their significance “are not sufficiently interrelated, because they are not 
deduced from a common set of assumptions” (Steiner 1981:351).  
 
In short this means that these favorable factors were originally not part of Lijphart’s 
consociational theory but were developed over time from the experiences of countries 
that applied consociational theory. The second issue to note is that, these favorable 
factors have undergone certain changes over time. As noted by Bogaards (1998:476)  
 
The lack of theoretical coherence shows in the considerable changes the favorable 
factors underwent in both number and content in the course of time. In four 
publications, spread over almost two decades, Lijphart (1968, 1969, 1977, and 
1985) mentions a total of 14 favorable factors.  
 
For instance, in Lijphart’s first publication 1968 there are six favorable factors, on the 
second publication 1969 they are eight; on the third (1977) there are nine and on the forth 
one, the 1985 publication contains eight favorable factors. As Bogaards (1998:482) 
states: 
 
Apart from making their own selection of favourable factors from Lijphart’s lists, 
authors have supplied additional favourable factors. Jimmy K. Tindigarukayo 
(1989) selects segmental isolation, traditions of elite accommodation and 
overarching cleavages and adds popular legitimacy of the ruling elites, respect for 
institutional rules and procedures, and compromise, trust and good will among 
political leaders as favourable factors for consociationalism and federalism in 
cultural plural societies of post-colonial states. Favourable factors do not suffice 
for H.E. Chehabi (1980) to explain the absence of consociationalism in Sri Lanka. 
Chehabi suggests adding three historical and socioeconomic factors: militant 
Sinhala nationalism, economic rivalry, and the constitutional framework. 
 
We therefore can conclude that estimates of favourable factors vary according to 
individual scholar’s conceptualization, and also according to conditions prevalent in the 
case-study countries. For example, the success of some favorable factors in the 
application of the consociational model in South Africa and Nigeria may depend on the 
different political climates pertaining in each country.  A Bogaards puts it:  
In other countries and from other perspectives, still other favourable factors could 
show up. The marginal utility of these additions might decrease, but there is no 
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way to determine their usefulness a priori. The inductive character of the 
favourable factors impairs a selection of relevant favourable factors on a 
theoretical basis. Their relevance has to be re-assessed for every specific case. 
(Bogaards 1998: 482) 
 
Having highlighted the variables and shifting patterns of conditions favourable to the 
application of consociational formula, the chapters will now itemize and discuss 
Lijphart’s (1997) 7 favourable conditions. 
 
1. A multiple balance of  power 
2. smaller rather than larger countries 
3. Multiparty systems 
4. Homogenous, isolated pillars not internally divided and scattered 
5. Over-arching loyalties 
6. A tradition of elite accommodation 
7. Cross-cutting cleavages 
 
A balance of power among the segments of multiple societies works better for 
consociational democracy than a society where there are two major segments. This 
according to Lijphart is because “if one segment has a clear majority its leaders may 
attempt to dominate rather than cooperate with the rival minority. And in a society with 
two segments of approximately equal size, the leaders of both may hope to win a majority 
and to achieve their aims by dominating instead of cooperation”. (Lijphart 1977:55) 
Furthermore, there are two elements that form part of the notion of ‘multiple balance of 
power’. Firstly, there is a need for a balance of power among the different segments of 
society, and secondly, there is a need that at least three different segments of society are 
present for the proper application of the consociational model. These elements are crucial 
because “a society with relatively few segments, say three or four, constitutes a much 
more favourable base than a highly fractionalized society. The reason is that cooperation 
among groups becomes more difficult as the number participating in negotiations 
increases” (Lijphart 1977: 56) 
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Secondly, the multiparty system tends to be favorable condition of consociational 
democracy. According to Lijphart (1977: 61)  
 
In plural societies with free elections, the salient social cleavages tend to be 
translated into party system cleavages; the political parties are likely to be the 
organized political manifestation of the segments. The presence of such segmental 
parties is favorable to consociational democracy. They can act as the political 
representatives of their segment, and they provide good methods for selecting the 
segmental leaders who will participate in grand coalition.  
 
It may be true that other countries with consociational elements which have a two-party 
system have had a stable political system than those with multiparty system. Lijphart 
(1977:62) acknowledges this claim,  
 
When one explains the stability of Austrian democracy in terms of the 
consociational model, however, one arrives at the opposite conclusion: Austria’s 
stability was largely due to the cooperation of the rival elites in a grand coalition, 
and the two-party system, especially in the earlier years, was a strain on this 
overarching cooperation rather than a support for it. 
 
To iron out this contradiction, Giovanni Sartoris divides the multiparty system into two 
categories, namely, moderate multiparty system and extreme multiparty system. 
Moderate multiparty systems are characterized by three or four parties as the normal 
number whereas extreme multiparty systems are characterized by a minimum of five 
parties. It therefore appears that in line with Sartoris ideas, moderate multiparty systems 
presents the most favorable factors for consociational democracy. But a few 
qualifications have to be met according to Lijphart (1977:64). 
  The argument in favor of moderate multiparty system is limited to plural 
societies only. In homogenous countries, a two – party system will be more stable 
and effective than a multiparty system, and it also has considerable advantages in 
terms of the quality of democracy. 
 Moderate multiparty is a favorable factor only on the condition that all parties are 
minority parties; furthermore, it is helpful if they are not too unequal in size 
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 In plural societies that are not moderately segmented – that is, those with  either 
only two or more than five or six significant segments – a two-party or an extreme 
multiparty system is preferable to moderate multipartysm. The most important 
criterion is that the political parties clearly and separately represent all the 
segments.  
 
Thirdly, with regard to size and consociational democracy, it appears that consociational 
democracy works best when the size of the country is small, and a greater number of 
small states have become consociational democracies than larger ones. It is important to 
note that there are direct and indirect effects on the probability that consociationalism 
will be established and will be a success and these effects of smallness are derived from 
both internal characteristics and external positions. As Lijphart states   
 
Small size has both direct and indirect effects on the probability that 
consociational democracy will be established and will be successful; it directly 
enhances a spirit of cooperativeness and accommodation, and it indirectly 
increases the chances of consociational democracy by reducing the burdens of 
decision making and thus rendering the country easier to govern (Lijphart 1977: 
65) 
 
Another reason that consociational democracy works effectively in smaller countries is 
that leaders of different segmental societies interact relatively frequently. This, according 
to Lijphart, is likely “to lead to a relatively high level of mutual goodwill, which in turn 
makes the political leaders prefer not to perceive politics as zero-sum game, in which a 
strategy of ‘all or nothing’ is applied”. (Lijphart 1977:66) It is worth noting that the 
contrary is true of larger states or countries. Leaders of different segmental societies tend 
to be scattered all over the country, this as a result makes it difficult to forge relations 
through constant interactions, thus consociational democracy is less likely to be a 
success. 
With regards to the external effects of the size factor, consociational democracy is more 
likely to be a success because smaller countries are likely to feel more threatened than 




Inasmuch as foreign threats may encourage and motivate unity in these smaller countries, 
another qualification needs to be added “such a threat must be perceived as a common 
danger by all of the segments in order to have a unifying effect” (Lijphart 1977:67).  
Cross-cutting cleavages can also be regarded as one of the favourable conditions for 
consociational democracy in that the examination of how two or more cleavages relate to 
each other is crucial in understanding the successes and failures of consociational 
democracies. Lijphart (1977: 75) states that 
 
perfectly cross-cutting and perfectly coinciding cleavages occur rarely, but 
differences in the degree to which they crosscut can be critically important for 
two reasons. In the first place, the way in which cleavages cut across each other 
affects the chances for consociational democracy because it affects the numbers 
and relative size of the segments and thus the balance of power among them. 
Secondly, crosscutting can have important consequences for the intensity of 
feelings generated by the cleavages. 
 
An example of the significance of cross-cutting cleavages as favourable factor for 
consociationalism is that, if for instance, a political cleavage and a social cleavage cross-
cut to a high degree, there will develop a feeling of equality among the political groups, 
but if the two cleavages tend to coincide one of the groups is more likely to feel relegated 
and unjustly represented.  
 
The last three favourable conditions for consociational democracy are: a tradition of elite 
accommodation; homogenous, isolated pillars not internally divided and scattered; and 
over-arching loyalties. The unification or cooperation of elites may be encouraged by 
their awareness of the dangers inherent in segmental cleavages. If political leaders engage 
in coalescent rather than adversarial decision making, plural societies are likely to enjoy a 
stable democratic government. “An alternative or additional factor predisposing political 
leasers to be moderate and cooperative is the prior existence of a tradition of elite 
accommodation” (Lijphart 1977: 100) In regard to ‘segmental isolation and federalism’ 
as the second to last favourable factor for consociational democracy, the idea is that a 
clear distinction of the boundaries of different societies may positively contribute towards 
sustainable democracy in plural societies. This is because danger may arise if these 
groups are in close contact. “[C]lear boundaries between the segments of plural society 
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have the advantage of limiting mutual contacts and consequently of limiting the chances 
of ever-present potential antagonism to erupt into actual hostility”. (Lijphart 1977:88) 
 
The final favourable condition for consociational democracy is based on ‘Over-arching 
loyalties’. Berg-Schlosser (1985:103) states that “The internal fragmentation of a society 
is usually supplemented by various common traits and points of identification which set it 
apart from other societies and serve, in one way or another, as a common bond”. This 
simply means that there is a need for social elements that characterise convergence 
among those plural societies for consociational democracy to be a success.  
 
 
Thus conflict is more likely to emerge is societies that are characterised by less 
overarching loyalties. This is because having less or no commonalities between groups 
may lead to one group segregating and considering the ‘other’ as totally distinct from the 
other and as a result conflict is likely to be an eventuality. “The conflict potential of 
cleavages also depends on the degree to which their inherent intensities are moderated by 
overarching loyalties”. (Lijphart 1977:80) 
 
This chapter has explored the consociational model as outlined in the literature. The 
chapter has argued that in Kenya, the relationship between conflict and ethnic nepotism 
or tribalism is sufficient to warrant application of consociational theory as an 
organizational and explanatory framework. The study now provides a detailed account of 










KENYA: HISTORICAL & POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF ELECTORAL 
CONFLICT, 1990 – 2008 
 
3.1 Introduction: Sources of Violence In Kenya 
Commenting on conflict in Kenya, Mueller (2008:191) argues that,  
 
A good deal of the statistical work in the political economy literature on conflict 
argues persuasively that conflict, particularly civil war, is driven mainly by greed 
rather than grievance, while others disagree. From the standpoint of the elite, 
many of whom already owned large tracts of land in the Rift and elsewhere, greed 
for political power, both by MPs from the area and by President Moi, appears to 
have been the motivating factor in the face of multi-party elections. 
 
As Mueller highlights, there is a connection between power and wealth in Kenya. The 
practices of the ruling elite tend to undermine the poor in Kenya. According to Kearney 
(1999:119) “Elite monetary interest and politics become inextricably intertwined, further 
estranging political action from the needs and demands of ordinary people and hampering 
a genuinely democratic form of leadership”. One of the resource sectors of which the 
elite in Kenya take advantage is the agricultural sector.  
 
Agricultural production is an important factor in Kenya’s economy. As Kearney 
(1999:99) notes: “Agricultural activity is concentrated in the highlands, the previous heart 
of the white colonial community and thereafter the Kikuyu ethnic group”. The Kikuyu 
had managed to dominate business and politics for decades because they have been 
favored by the colonialist for a long time.  Anderson (2005:4-5) puts it more succinctly,  
 
The Kikuyu occupied the rich highland in the central region of the colony close to 
Nairobi and adjacent to the main areas of white settlement. These energetic 
farmers worked the deep, red soil to good advantage. They were enterprising in 
business and, much as the advent of colonial rule had deprived them of lands and 
exploited their labor, many Kikuyu made the most of the opportunities afforded 
by the connections to an imperial economy. 
 
Thus the accumulation of wealth by a particular ethnic group during the colonial era 
created economic imbalances in post-colonial Kenya, and thus the economic factor can 
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be regarded as a seminal cause of violence. As the above quotation suggests, colonialism 
instituted a process of conflating ethnicity and socio-economic class. For example, the 
Kalenjin may have historically accumulated more wealth than the Lou, thus to ensure that 
goods and resources are kept within ethnic domain, they (Kalenjin) would find it hard to 
release political power to a different ethnic group. “[B]ut it has also been observed that in 
the process of colonial 'development' some groups adapted much earlier than the others. 
The Kikuyu are said to have been the first to adapt their social structure and culture to the 
capitalist mode of production” (Leys 1975: 200) 
 
Particularly when Moi was in power, Kenya’s politics revolved around money and many 
politicians utilized high government position in order to accumulate wealth. As Bakari 
puts it; “Kenyan politics was for a long time all about money. He who had the money 
controlled the politics, and Moi used money, or access to money in the form of fat 
government contracts, high governmental positions that were virtually sinecures, and in 
the last decade, access to land” (2002:271). Indeed, even Kenya’s first and most 
illustrious President, Jomo Kenyatta, was not an exception to this rule. According to 
Klopp & Kamungi (2008:13), “[B]oth these presidents- Kenyatta and Moi— the former 
Kikuyu, the latter Kalenjin—used their power to reward a small group of supporters with 
business opportunities and, most crucially, land”. 
 
The manifestly unequal allocation of state resources generates hatred and vendettas 
amongst different ethnic groups. Arguably, violence is inevitable as a result of 
differences and inequality created between ethnic communities. Furthermore, unequal 
allocation began with colonialism and was replicated by successive post-colonial 
regimes. As earlier stated, the correlation between ethnicity and access or non-access to 
wealth began with colonialism –a point reinforced by Klopp and Kamungi 
 
Land has been a key issue in Kenyan politics ever since the British colonial 
government claimed large tracts of fertile land in the Central Province and the 
Rift Valley for white settlement and abetted grossly unequal property relations 
between ethnic communities along the coast. At independence— prodded by the 
1950s Mau Mau rebellion over land rights and freedom, which claimed as many 
as 13,000 Kenyan lives and led to the arrest of an estimated 70,000 Kikuyu 
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tribesmen—President Kenyatta quickly moved to recentralize power in the office 
of the president. Land owned by displaced white settlers was bought on a “willing 
buyer, willing seller basis” and turned into settlement schemes. Elites, especially 
Kenyatta and his family, gained access to large tracts of land and pushed the 
poorer Kikuyu, many of whom fought in the Mau Mau rebellion, into informal 
settlements in Nairobi or farther afield in the Rift Valley in search of small pieces 
of land opened up by the sale of settlers’ farms. (2008:12) 
 
The personalization of power within a particular ethnic group in Kenyan society has had 
many effects, not only in regard to rigging elections but also in terms of creating doubt in 
the minds of many citizens about the proper functioning of the state. According to the 
Waki Report (2008: 23) 
 
[V]iolence has become a factor not just of elections but in everyday life. What 
this means in practice is that violence is widespread and can be tapped for a 
variety of reasons, including but not exclusively to win elections. Second is the 
growing power and personalization of power around the Presidency. This has had 
a twofold impact. First, it has given rise to the view among politicians and the 
general public that it is essential for the ethnic group from which they come to 
win the Presidency in order to ensure access to state resources and goods. Second 
it also has led to a deliberate denudation of the authority and legitimacy of other 
oversight institutions that could check abuses of power and corruption and 
provide some accountability, and at the same time be seen by the public as neutral 
arbiters with respect to contentious issues, such as disputed elections results. 
 
Thus, a characteristic of Kenyan politics is ethnic accumulation of state resources. 
According to Stevees (2006:214)  
 
The key to understanding Kenyan politics is that political leadership is grounded 
in ethnic communities. Aspiring politicians must gain the support of their ethnic 
community whether at the level of their sub-clan, their clan or the community as a 
whole. This means that those who have been elevated as leaders must fight for 
their community at the centre and bring valued resources back home. If politicians 
fail to deliver the goods, they will be rejected at the next election. Leaders are 
those who are successful in advancing the interests and addressing the needs of 
the group. Individuals vote along the lines of ethnic ties. Political representation 
within the Kenyan context, therefore, means group representation.  
 
The accumulation of resources by a particular ethnic group reinforces and perpetuates 
ethnic voting. In consequence, it is arguable that Kenya’s political and electoral system is 
informed by ‘identity politics’ “Such voting implies that voting is not the outcome of a 
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careful evaluation of policy positions or the performance of leaders. Instead, it is identity 
that matters” (Kimenyi and Romero 2008: 4) Factors determining the voters’ decisions 
could be skin color, religion, sexual orientation; ethnicity etc. “Race, gender, and other 
identity categories are most often treated in mainstream liberal discourse as vestiges of 
bias or domination-that is, as intrinsically negative frameworks in which social power 
works to exclude or marginalize those who are different” (Crenshaw 1991: 1242). This is 
a problematic that is particularly applicable in post-colonial states like Kenya that have 
inherited from the colonial state the notion of ethnic entrenched ‘difference’. As Oyugi 
(1997:42) puts it:  
 
The notion of 'a people's own area' which resulted from the formal politico-
administrative regimentation of the colonized people into ethnic administrative 
enclaves was later to lead to the heightening of ethnic self-identity or sense of 
belonging. It also in the process, created a sense of exclusiveness which sooner or 
later manifested itself in the rejection of 'outsiders'.  
 
3.2 The History of ‘Ethnic Nepotism’ or ‘Tribalism’ In Kenya Between 1963 – 
1990 
3.2.1 The Kenyatta era 
At independence in 1963, Kenya had a multiparty constitution. In 1969 however, KANU 
merged with Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). Also in 1969 an important 
opposition party – Kenya People’s Unity (KPU) was banned and Kenya became a de-
facto one-party state. As stated in the IFES final Report (2008:6) 
 
After KANU and the opposition party, Kenya African Democratic Union 
(KADU), merged to pave the way for a de facto single-party system. An 
opposition party formed in 1966, the Kenya Peoples’ Union (KPU), was banned 
three years later and its leaders detained. 
 
In 1982, Kenya’s constitution was amended to make Kenya a de-jure one party state. In 
other words, KANU was made the only legal party in Kenya. KANU’s ethnic base 
consisted of the Kikuyu and the Lou as major ethnic groups. However, under Kenyatta, 
elite members of the Kikuyu ethnic group received preferential treatment in the 
distribution of wealth.  
 
  35
Jomo Kenyatta consolidated power by dispensing privileges and economic favors 
to placate the country's various ethnic groups and by using authoritarian methods 
to silence critics and potential rivals. Nevertheless, opponents perceived 
favoritism towards the Kikuyu and suppression of non-Kikuyu leaders. 
(Chenoweth & Young 2007) 
 
Indeed it was evident that Kenyatta was playing the ethnic card during his time in power. 
Many Kikuyus held prominent positions in government and also in institutions of Higher 
learning; in fact most Kikuyu were responsible for any areas where authority was to be 
exercised.  As Murunga (2004:187) states;  
 
The provincial administration and strategic positions in the bureaucracy were 
heavily ethnically partial in favor of the Kikuyu. By the time of Kenyatta’s death, 
four out of the eight Provincial Commissioners were Kikuyu. In 1974, seven out 
of the twenty cabinet ministers were Kikuyu and five of these seven were from 
Kiambu, Kenyatta’s home district. In the University of Nairobi, for example, then 
Kenya’s only public University, ‘all the top 10 administrative positions... were 
held by members of the Kikuyu community’. While in colonial times the army 
was composed mainly of the Kamba and Kalenjin, by 1967, 22.7 percent of the 
officers were Kikuyu. So ethicized was the provincial administration and strategic 
positions in the civil service that even the permanent secretary in charge of 
provincial administration was a Kikuyu. There were in 1970 nine Kikuyu 
permanent secretaries out of the total twenty-two. Their selection and posting was 
so irregular that even illiterate ones would be posted to such crucial positions. 
 
As noted, then, in the first instance, Kenyatta was responsible for the ethnicization of 
government in Kenya. This ethnicization of government created experiences of inequality 
amongst Kenyans; such experiences were constructed as ethnic nepotism or tribalism1 by 
non-Kikuyu Kenyans. The creation of ethnic representation further affected the sense of 
belonging as many Kenyans felt excluded from the government. Murunga (2004: 187) 
contends that; 
 
The ethnicization of government institutions affected the sense of belonging to 
Kenya among groups and people who were excluded. A long lasting effect of this 
is that positions in the bureaucracy and provincial administration are now 
perceived and allocated using ethnic prisms. Holders of government positions are 
perceived as ethnic representatives. There were some presumed gains for the 
                                                            
1 As defined by Mazrui and Afolayan – see chapter 2 
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Kikuyu community when Kenyatta was the head of the state that translated into 
non-Kikuyu resentment of the Kikuyu precisely because they felt marginalised 
from the very state that needed their allegiance. 
 
As Barkan (2004:88) puts it; 
 
If Kenyatta's Kenya had a basic flaw, it was that most of its prosperity was 
concentrated among the members of Kenyatta's ethnic group, the Kikuyu. 
Residing mainly north and west of Nairobi and comprising the largest ethnic 
group in Kenya,… the Kikuyu formed the core of Kenya's nationalist movement 
and came to dominate the civil service and the private sector during the 1960s and 
1970s. 
 
The above findings show the prevalence of ethnic nepotism or tribalism in Kenya, and 
therefore the significant role that consociational formula may play as a theoretical 
framework in understanding the extent to which ethnicity (negatively conceptualized) has 
shaped power configuration and contestation in Kenya.  
 
3.2.2 The Moi Era  
Moi took the Presidency in 1978 when Kenyatta died, before then he had been Kenyatta’s 
vice president for twelve years. Interestingly, Moi did not come from the same ethnic 
group as Kenyatta. Instead Moi comes from the Kalenjin ethnic group in the Rift valley. 
However, a predisposition that Moi shared with his predecessor was the centralization of 
power in the person of the President. As Murunga (2004:188) puts it  
 
If the strong imprint of the personality of the president characterised the state in 
the Kenyatta era, presidential powers were not reduced following Moi’s ascension 
to power. Rather, the person of Moi took over that of Kenyatta in redefining state 
operations in Kenya. 
 
 Moi also earned the presidential seat partly because he did not participate much in 
political conflicts perpetrated by ethnic groups; he also earned the presidential seat 
because he lacked an influential political base. Thus, Moi was perceived – incorrectly, as 
it turned out – as neutral or impartial in the arena of ethnic – based powers. In fact, once 
in power, Moi played the ethnic card.  
 
  37
He set out to redress the ethnic imbalances created by Kenyatta by “pursuing a set of 
redistributive policies that favored his own ethnic group the Kalenjin -and other 
disadvantaged tribes in the Rift valley” (Barkan:2004: 88). Moi was also faced with a 
challenge of consolidating his power since he did not come from the Kikuyu ethnic 
group. To do this effectively, he needed to form a coalition that was going to be in his 
favor. “The need for a new coalition was important given that the clique surrounding 
Kenyatta had tried to block Moi’s ascension to power when they fronted the change-the-
constitution movement” (Murunga 2004:188).  
 
As Adar and Munya (2001) explain; 
 
… [M]oi also embarked on the gradual Kalenjinization of the public and private 
sectors from the 1980s. Moi is a Tugen, one of the smaller Kalenjin ethnic groups. 
He began to "de-Kikuyunize" the civil service and the state-owned enterprises 
previously dominated by the Kikuyu ethnic group during Kenyatta's regime. He 
appointed Kalenjins in key posts in, among others, Agricultural Development 
Corporation (ADC), Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB), Kenya Posts and 
Telecommunications (KPT), Central Bank of Kenya (CBK), Kenya Industrial 
Estates (KIE), National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB), and the Kenya Grain 
Growers Cooperative Union (KGGCU). He created Nyayo Tea Zones (NTZ), 
Nyayo Bus Company (NBC) and Nyayo Tea Zones Development Corporation 
(NTZDC). 
 
Moi was also involved in corruption and abuse of power which eventually affected 
Kenya’s economy. According to Holmquist et al (1994:92) 
 
Moi inserted ethnic cohorts and allies into key positions in the state and parastatal 
and nongovernmental organizations that service the modern urban and large-
holder sectors, and sometimes market the coffee, tea, and other crops of the large-
holder and competitive sectors. But because of state sector intervention, the 
performance of several agricultural institutions was impaired and large-holder, 
and probably competitive, sector growth was compromised with negative 
ramifications throughout the economy. 
 
Another factor that drew attention to the ethnic trajectory of Moi’s leadership was his 
suspected involvement in the murder of a government official whose ethnic origin was 
Kikuyu. Arguably, this was part of his effort to undermine the Kikuyu base of national 
government and replace it with his own people, thereby enabling the perpetuation of his 
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term in office. It is also alleged that Moi utilized his dominance within KANU to 
undermine not only other ethnic groups but also civil society organization. For example, 
according to Adar and Munyae; 
 
Peaceful rallies calling for political and constitutional reforms were persistently 
violently broken up by the security forces. On June 10, 1999, the police, 
complemented by a squad of "KANU youth" and the infamous jeshi la mzee 
(which in Swahili literally means, old man's militia), violently disrupted a 
peaceful rally organized by religious and civil society groups to protest the 
government's handling of the constitutional review process. A number of people, 
including the Reverend Timothy Njoya who has been vocal in criticizing the 
government, were seriously injured (Adar & Munyae 2001:12) 
 
Adar and Munyae further note that Moi’s manipulative tactics included mobilizing the 
KANU youth wing to conduct membership recruitment which attracted approximately 
four million new members for the ruling party. Citizens without a party card were not 
allowed to undertake business transactions. Butler (2010:17), states 
 
The ability of Moi to manipulate the judiciary in the past ensured that impunity 
would remain constant. As a result of the power enjoyed by the Executive branch, 
cases were brought before “politically correct judges” who because of their desire 
to protect their jobs and secure state favors, were willing to do everything possible 
to rule in favor of the presidency 
 
Finally, Nangulu-Ayuku (2007:127) argues that “in any case, Kenya is not an easy 
country to govern; it has over 40 ethnic groups, volatile politicians, a sophisticated and 
powerful elite representing a variety of different and sometimes conflicting interests 
scattered over a wide and varied geographical landscape”. Thus, as this section has 
sought to make clear, problematics of politics and governance in Kenya are deep-rooted. 
This did not augur well for a peaceful constitutional transition to a de jure multi-party 
system.     
 
3.3 Transition To Multi-Party System 1992 
In December 1992 a multi-party system was re-introduced in Kenya. As Bakari observes; 
 
By the early 1990s KANU was seen more as a tool of self-enrichment and self-
aggrandizement by both the party politicians and the general public at large. It had 
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increasingly lost its credibility as development oriented and it had degenerated 
into the classic Fanonist conception of post – independence African political 
parties, which start off well as nationalistic, anti-colonial and well- intentioned, 
until the national bourgeoisie discover the usefulness of the party as a conduit to 
personal wealth, self-preservation and absolute power. (2002: 270) 
 
Moi was reluctant to accept constitutional reform, but came under increasing pressure 
from Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD), along with other new parties and 
the international community. As Haugerud (1995:20) puts it … “the effectiveness of pro-
democracy voices in Kenya and elsewhere strengthened by ties with the international 
press and with international church and human rights organizations such as Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch”.  
 
It is noteworthy that FORD played a significant role in the introduction of multiparty 
politics in Kenya.  FORD was formed in 1991 by six opposition leaders, including 
Oginga Odinga (who went on to become Vice-President). As a political movement, 
FORD’s main intention was to oppose a political culture which was mainly characterized 
by power centralization, nepotism and the self-aggrandizement of dominant groups. 
FORD extended the national arena of Kenyan politics when President Moi bowed to 
international pressure to allow the registration of political parties. It is also noteworthy 
that FORD received most of its professional and political leaders from former members 
of KANU. As Throup and Hornsby (1998:93) state; 
 
With the restoration of multi-party politics after 22 years, in December 1991 and 
January 1992 new recruits flocked into FORD as disgruntled politicians 
abandoned KANU and Kenya’s professionals considered that it was now safe to 
identify with the opposition. From 2 December onwards, Central Province  and to 
a lesser extent Nyanza were swept by waves of resignation from KANU, as 
political leaders and ten of thousands of voters defected en masse to the new 
movement. They included many well respected politicians outside the current 
leadership, and some senior figures within the existing government. 
 
Unfortunately, however, the existence of a viable opposition party and the reintroduction 
of multi-partysm did not necessarily address the longstanding problematic of ethnic 
nepotism or tribalism. Indeed, it complicated the picture. For instance, according to the 
Los Angeles Times, (2 January 2008), “Tribal tensions have simmered in Kenya since 
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multiparty elections were reintroduced in 1992 and the country's more than 40 tribes 
competed over power and resources. Much of the resentment is directed at Kibaki's 
[Leader of the Democratic Party] Kikuyu tribe, the largest ethnic group, seen by others as 
having dominated politics and business for decades”, specifically since the 
decolonization period.  
 
By the same token, When Raila Odinga [current leader of the Orange Democratic 
Movement] was interviewed by the Mail and Guardian; he was asked if the [Electoral] 
violence has permanently transformed ethnic relations in Kenya. His response was  
 
Certainly it has confounded things, so the country is more polarized along 
ethnic…lines than any time since before independence. We will need to work on 
reconciliation for society, so that were refuse the polarization that has taken place 
in the past two months. (Wolters 2008: 14) 
 
3.4 Fragmentation Of The Opposition And Increased Ethnic Tensions 
In August of 1992, FORD split into two separate factions, the first being FORD – Asili 
and the second being FORD – Kenya. These two groups were led by ex-government 
minister Kenneth Matiba and Raila Odinga respectively and these two parties were 
ethnically based. “The party fragmented further into FORD-PEOPLE, led by Kenneth 
Matiba, who had fallen out with Moi, and became the focus of Kikuyu support and 
mobilization” (Bakari 2002:276) During the general elections, two thousand people were 
killed in tribal conflict , especially in the Rift Valley (see Figure 1,chapter 1,p 3). 
 
This kind of factionalism within FORD undermined its prospects of victory in the 1992 
elections, an outcome which benefited Moi who was voted in as Kenya’s president for 
another five-year term. “The Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) was 
unable to agree on a leader, by splitting into three parties, FORD’s much-vaunted cause 
became hopeless. Moi, the beneficiary of his opposition’s vanity, won with just one third 




elections of 1992 were bedeviled by “the oppositions’ lack of cohesiveness and inability 
to form an alliance against KANU”. Thus Moi and KANU were able to remain in control. 
 
3.5 1997 Election 
The 1997 elections in Kenya followed a pattern of violence similar to that encountered 
during the 1992 election.  “The elections were conducted in the glare of international 
publicity, not least because the international community was seriously concerned about 
whether the elections would be free and fair” (Kanyongolo & Lunn 1998:1).  
 
There are divergent views about Moi’s victory. Some scholars argue that Moi’s second 
consecutive victory was the result of other parties failing to form an alliance against 
KANU. For example, (Tordoff 1997:16) argues that “…[B]ecause of the oppositions' 
lack of cohesiveness and inability to form an alliance against KANU, Moi and KANU 
were able to remain in control.” Furthermore, Nystrom (2000) attests that “Factionalism 
among the opposition prevented them (opposition parties) from presenting a unified front 
against Moi and KANU in the 1997 elections as was the case in the 1992 elections” 
(Nystron, C.,2000) 
 
3.5.1 Moi’s Questionable Victory 
On the other hand, Engel argues that the regime contributed greatly to Moi’s victory by 
using its incumbent status to control the results. “All the signs are that Moi is falling back 
on host of other tried and tested manipulations – from a lopsided electoral system to 
organized violence” ( Engel 1997:26). Since Moi had been in power for a long time, he 
used every possible mean to ensure his stay in power; this may have included bribing 
electoral officers and others who were involved in the electoral process. For instance, 
according to the Donors Democratic Development Group (DDDG), there were a number 
of irregularities during the 1997 elections, all pointing towards Moi as the manipulator of 
the election. These kinds of irregularities ranged from misprints to bribery. Foeken and 
Dietz (2000:145) state that  
 
First, there were cases of misprints and omission of candidates’ names on the 
ballot papers. Even the Electoral Commission itself had to admit (in the press 
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release of 31 Dec 1997) that under such circumstances ‘it cannot be said such 
elections were fair’. Second, in 13 per cent of the stations the secrecy of the vote 
was not guaranteed. Third, bribery and vote buying were common, even on 
Election Day. 
 
It appears that the irregularities and malpractices during the 1997 election could be found 
in most sectors. The Electoral Commission was also blamed during the election process. 
For example, there were reports that the Electoral Commission (EC) had delayed in 
opening some of the polling stations and this was due to the late arrivals of voting 
material such as ballot boxes, ballot papers and stamps. Some of these malpractices and 
irregularities included vote buying, harassment and intimidation of voters, particularly by 
the youth of KANU’92 (YK ’92). Corruption and spending of state money to support 
Moi and his party was the order of the day.  
 
Unlike the opposition parties, KANU disposed of large sums of money (state 
money according to many) and was, for instance, able to set up national and 
provisional secretariats for its support group with full-time staff. An estimated 
US$60 million was spent on vote buying, mostly by KANU supporters. Expenses 
ranged from hiring transport for voters and bodyguards for candidates, to 
employing thugs and distributing party T-shirts or even cash money to passer-by. 
(Foeken and Dietz 2000: 135) 
 
This was Kenya’s second set of multiparty election since the introduction of multiparty 
politics in 1992. Moi’s main opposition was led by Odinga (Raila), the son of Oginga 
Odinga and ex vice- president Mwai Kibaki representing the National Democratic Party 
(NDP). These elections further received tremendous criticism from the international 
community. The international community was concerned about the outcome of the 
elections. According to Kanyongolo and Lunn (1998: 1-2) 
 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch decided to send a joint mission 
to Kenya to carry out research into the roots and repercussions of the violence. 
The joint mission, which visited Kenya between 29 March and 9 April 1998, had 
four main objectives: to obtain first-hand information on the post-election 
violence in Rift Valley Province; to provide support to human rights activists at 
risk; to explore the human rights dimensions of the ongoing process of 
constitutional reform; and to seek to persuade government officials, 
representatives of local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
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representatives of the donor community to place human rights at the heart of that 
process. 
 
It is noteworthy that little was done by the Kenyan government to prevent or control 
outbreaks of violence, nuch of it ethnicity based, in the post election period. The main 
ethnic clashes broke between the Kikuyus and the Kalenjins. Supporters of KANU, the 
Kalenjins were against relinquishing political power to the Kikuyu. The Kikuyu were 
opposing KANU which had been under Moi’s rule and were supporting Mwai Kibaki, 
leader and founder of the Democratic Party.  
 
Below is a summary of violent attacks that took place after the elections.  
 
 On the night of 11 January 1998, some members of the Pokot and Samburu ethnic 
groups raided the home of a Kikuyu widow at a place called Mirgwit in the 
Laikipia District of the Rift Valley Province. The raiders raped the woman and 
stole some livestock from the household. A group of Kikuyu men followed the 
raiders but, having failed to catch up with them, entered a Samburu compound 
where, in retaliation, they mutilated livestock that they found there. Mutilation of 
livestock is highly taboo for pastoralists such as the Samburu and Pokot. 
 On the night of 13 January 1998, some Pokot and Samburu men attacked Kikuyu 
communities in the Magande, Survey, Motala, Milimani and Mirgwit areas of Ol 
Moran in Laikipia. It appears that the attackers were armed not only with spears, 
bows and arrows, but also with guns. It was claimed that some of the attackers 
were dressed in military-type clothing. It has been estimated that over 50 Kikuyus 
were killed during these attacks and over 1000 others fled the area and sought 
refuge at the Roman Catholic Church at Kinamba, from where they were later 
relocated to temporary shelters at Sipili and Ol Moran. 
 On 21 January, about 70 unidentified people invaded three farms in Njoro 
including one belonging to the newly elected DP Member of Parliament for Molo 
Constituency, Kihika Kimani. Three days later, groups of what local residents 
described as Kalenjins attacked Kikuyus in parts of Njoro in the same 
constituency. 
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 The attack on Kikuyus on 24 January provoked a counter-attack by a group of 
apparently well organized Kikuyus, who on 25 January attacked Kalenjin 
residents of Naishi or Lare in Njoro. According to police reports, 34 Kikuyus and 
48 Kalenjins were killed during these initial attacks and over 200 houses were 
burnt down. Hundreds of people from both communities were displaced by the 
fighting, and many of them fled to temporary ‘camps’ at Kigonor, Sururu, 
Larmudiac mission and Mauche. (Kanyongolo and Lunn 1998: 5) 
 
Thus, as did the 1992 election that re-introduced the country to multiparty democracy, the 
1997 election also carried with it patterns of violence characterized by ethnic rivalry and 
identity politics.  
 
3.6 2002 Election 
By the end of Moi’s term of office in 2002, Moi tried other political strategies and 
devices to ensure that his party remains in power so as to enable him to still benefit from 
the Kenyan government. For example; “Moi unilaterally endorsed Uhuru Kenyatta, the 
son of his predecessor, Jomo Kenyatta, as his de facto successor as part of a grand 
scheme to perpetuate his patrimonial rule by proxy” (Kwagwanja 2005: 52). Despite 
Moi’s attempt of forming strategies of instrumentalising generational identity, the party 
eventually experienced intra-conflicts, functionalism and this led to its electoral defeat in 
2002. “[O]ther signs indicated that all was not well within KANU as several other senior 
party members, including several cabinet ministers and Vice President Saitoti, were 
interested in challenging for the party’s nomination”. (The Carter Center 2003: 17) 
National Rainbow Coalition (NARC)’s presidential candidate Mwai Kibaki won the 
election and took over as president of Kenya. “Mwi Kibaki won a comfortable 62.2 per 
cent of the vote (3,646,713) to Uhuru Kenyatta’s 31.3 per cent (1,834,468).” (Bakari 
2002: 284). The table below shows the votes cast and the percentage votes cast in the 





Table 1 Votes Cast in the Presidential Elections 
Source: (Throup 2003:7) 
 
Table 2 Percentage Votes Cast in the Presidential elections 
Source: (Throup 2003:7) 
 
Elischer argues that the main reason for KANU’s defeat was the coalescing of ethnically 
based parties around the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC). FORD Asili and FORD-
Kenya remain two separate ethnically based political parties. The ethnically based parties 
around NARC were; “Kibaki’s Kikuyus, Ngilu’s Kambas, Wamalwa’s and Musalia’s 
Luhyas, and Odinga’s Luos, it (NARC) managed to beat New KANU using the same 
means Moi had so successfully employed for over a decade” ( Elischer 2008: 20). (Note 
that, it was the National Alliance Party of Kenya (NAK) that allied itself with the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) to later on form the NARC in preparation of the 2002 elections). 
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While it is significant that this year (2002) marked the end of Daniel arap Moi’s 24 year 
rule, it also marked Kenya’s new era of electoral violence under a different leader. As a 
result of the 2002 election in Kenya,  
 
Kibaki defeated KANU’s Uhuru Kenyatta by 61.3 percent to 31.6 percent of the 
popular vote, while FORD- PEOPLE’s Simeion Nyachae won 6.5 percent of the  
presidential vote, and James Orengo of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), and 
Waweru Ng’ethe of Chama cha Umma, secured only 0.4 and 0.2 percent. (Throup 
2003: 3) 
 
According to Kwagwanja (2005:51) 
 
The electoral victory of the ethnically [Kikuyus Kambas Luhyas and the Luos] based 
parties coalesced around the NARC ended Daniel arap Moi’s 24-year patrimonial 
rule, which many Kenyans blamed for their economic miseries and for the erosion 
of accountability of state power and of respect for citizenship rights and the ideals 
of nationhood, reduced by corruption, greed and the cynical manipulation of 
ethnicity. 
 
According to Wrong (2008) “When Mwai Kibaki won the 2002 elections at the head of 
the multi-ethnic coalition; many expected such tensions would dissipate. But the new 
president threw out the draft of the new constitution trimming his executive powers, 
sacked his coalition partners and withdrew into an ethnic citadel” (Wrong, M., 2000). 
According to Wrong (2008), “Kenyans complained that the Kikuyus were at it again. The 
"Mount Kenya Mafia" - cronies from Kibaki's Kikuyu tribe and its neighboring Embu 
and Meru groups - was playing the old patronage game” (Wrong, M, 2000). Thus 
tensions trigged violence in the 2002 election.  
 
The violence of 2002 included; personal and physical attacks amongst citizens; domestic 
violence which included marital rape and female genital mutilation; violence against 
women in communities such as rape; violence against women perpetrated by the state 
such as torture and impunity, police treatment and prison conditions. This conflict also 
carried with it tensions arising from ethnic rivalry. As Ali Dinar puts it;  
 
 [P]arliamentary by-elections in early 2001 were associated with serious violence. 
…[S]poradic violence between members of ethnic groups seen to be allied to the 
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ruling party and those perceived to support the opposition continued in the run-up 
to the 2002 election. Inter-ethnic fighting in late 2001 in the interior of Coast 
Province, as well as episodes of such violence in Nairobi in late 2001 and early 
2002, claimed dozens of lives.3 
 
As a way of trying to end the violence and bring peace amongst the Kenyan people, 
President Mwai Kibaki promised to implement a new constitution in 2002. He had 
intended to implement the constitution within 100 days in office, but these kinds of 
promises ended up fading away once he got into office. It was only in 2003 that the 
Kibaki government started working on a constitutional review process. As Horowitz 
(2008:3) writes.  
 
In 2003 the Kibaki government established a constitutional review process, 
ostensibly with the aim of developing a new draft constitution that could be put 
before the public in the national referendum. However, the review process 
became highly contentious and ultimately produced a draft – the so called 
“Bomas” draft – that divided the political elite. The Bomas draft contained both 
inclusive and exclusive power-sharing provisions. The draft however was never 
put to the public vote. Before the referendum, which was held in November 2005, 
the Attorney General modified the draft, stripping the main power-sharing 
features from the bill. The final referendum vote, which saw politicians and voters 
divide largely along ethnic lines, failed by a wide margin. Once again, 




3.6.1 The 2005 National Referendum 
 
According to (Kimenyi and Shughart II 2008:3) “In November 2005, Kenyans voted in a 
constitutional referendum asking them to accept or reject a proposed constitution which, 
if approved by the majority of the voters, would have replaced the current constitution”. 
The proposed constitution was brought about by President Kibaki in his inaugural address 
to demonstrate his commitment to advancing democracy after bringing to an end 40 years 
                                                            
3 Ali Dinar (2002),  Kenya: political violence 11/06/02 ,http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Urgent_Action/apic-
061102.html 
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of rule by President Moi. The voting of the referendum was divided into two campaigns, 
the “NO” campaign and the “YES” campaign. The “NO” campaign was to vote for a 
constitutional reform while the “YES” campaign was to vote against constitutional 
reform, meaning being resistant to change and being in favor of  the status quo.  
As a result, 
 
It [the referendum] was rejected by a landslide of ‘‘No’’ votes. The principal 
reason for defeat, in the eyes of its opponents, was that the proposed constitution, 
much like the one it was meant to replace, endowed the executive branch with 
excessive political authority. The majority of voters instead favored a system in 
which substantial power would be devolved to the national legislature, with a 
prime minister serving as head of government. Thus, the proposed constitution’s 
failure to deal with the most salient political issue—constraining executive 
power—was the proximate cause of its overwhelming rejection. (Kimenyi and 
Shughart II 2008:3) 
 
The key aim of the referendum was to bring about accountability and transparency to 
Kenya’s political system. According to Juma (2007: 15) 
 
The main objectives of this campaign were to inter alia: enhance transparency and 
accountability in the public sphere by working to strengthen democratic 
governance; and, to expose statements and or speeches by political ‘leaders’, 
which amounted to incitement or calls for ethnic nationalism and/or hatred of 
external ethnic groups. 
 
It can therefore be noted from the above incidences that Kenya appears to find it hard to 
deal with issues emanating from identity politics. Even when new leaders are voted into 
power, there seems to be a lack of confidence in their ability to deal effectively with 
ethnic tensions. For example, the November 2005 national referendum 
 
[W]as rejected by 58% of voters. This result was also widely viewed as a vote of 
no confidence in President Kibaki’s government. This prompted President Kibaki 
to dismiss his entire government and start with a new team which excluded all 
those Ministers (mainly from the LDP faction of the NARC Coalition) who 
campaigned and voted against the Wako Draft. Some ministerial nominees 
rejected their appointments. This effectively marked the end of the NARC 
Coalition. (Owiti 2008:13) 
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Thus, in highlighting significant points of political convergence in Kenya, it is critical to 
look at Kenya’s political conflict and the significance of the power-sharing agreement of 
2008 in order to address issues such as ethnic nepotism or tribalism and the impact these 
phenomena have on Kenya’s political system.  
 
3.7 Kenya’s 2007- 2008 Elections  
In March 2007 Kenyans went to the polls to participate in the presidential, parliamentary 
and civic election. The elections of 2007 were Kenya’s fourth election since the re-
introduction of multiparty politics in 19914. According to Dagne (2008:2),  
 
An estimated 14.2 million (82% of the total eligible voters) Kenyans were 
registered to vote, while 2,547 Parliamentary candidates were qualified to run in 
210 constituencies, according to the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK). A 
total of 15,331 candidates were approved to compete in the 2,498 local wards. 
Nine candidates competed in the presidential election.  
 
Party contenders for the presidential election of 2007 included Mwai Kibaki, Raila 
Odinga and Kalonzo Musyoka. These contenders had their own complex histories of 
party affiliation.  
 
Kibaki reconstituted his coalition as the Party of National Unity (PNU), which 
included members of Moi and Kenyatta’s KANU. In the meantime, ODM 
constructed a coalition of leaders labeled the ‘Pentagon’ from the spread of 
Kenyan provinces: Odinga from Nyanza province…[F]alling out with ODM, 
Kalonzo Musyoka formed the splinter ODM-Kenya (ODM-K). (Gibson and Long 
2009:2) 
 
Musyoko [the extant Vice President of Kenya] however did not receive much support 
outside the Ukamban region in the Eastern province which is where his home is based, 
and for that reason, Kenya’s presidential election was a race between Odinga from the 
ODM and Kibaki for the PNU. It is noteworthy, that both candidates formerly had been 
members of KANU – but had different ethnic origins.   
 
                                                            
4 Previous multiparty elections were held in 1992,1997 and 2002 
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The race, which was closely fought by Kibaki and Odinga, was the first election 
in Kenya’s history to pit a Kikuyu against a Luo. Leaders from the two groups 
have at times worked together, as in the early days of KANU or more recently 
when Odinga and Kibaki joined forces in 2002 to defeat Moi. However, there is a 
long history of bad blood between the two groups that dates back to the 
independence era. (Horowitz 2008: 3) 
 
Noteworthy, also, is that Odinga and Kibaki respectively targeted different socio-
economic groups, thus ensuring that class distinctions were highlighted as a feature of the 
election.  
 
Both Odinga and Kibaki took positions that played on their policy strengths, 
highlighting differences over salience and solutions. In appealing to Kenya’s 
wealthier and growing urban middle class, Kibaki touted his performance in 
achieving a robust growth rate. Odinga fashioned a more populist message, 
charging Kibaki with helping the rich and ignoring the country’s poor. 
 
This election was observed by a number of internal and external organizations, including 
President Mwai Kibaki’s advisors, the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK), the 
United States and the European Union Election Observation Mission (EUEOM) which 
was an independent European body ensuring a high standard for democratic elections. 
 
 
For the purpose of ensuring accountability and equality in Electoral Governance in 
Kenya, the Election Monitoring and Response Centre (EMRC) was established. 
Commenting on Kenya Human Rights Commision Report (KHRC), Juma (2008:16) 
states that “The goal of the EMRC was to support the creation of a conducive electoral 
environment where voters and candidates would not face limitations that would adversely 
undermine their fundamental freedoms in the course of participating in the 2007 General 
Elections”.  The figure below shows the areas KHRC monitored; it also depicts the 







Provinces, Constituencies and Monitors 
 
Source Juma (2008: 18) 
 
According to Juma, the brief of the EMRC was to  
 
Monitor and document the observance of human rights standards by all actors in 
the electoral process and, to campaign and lobby for the observance of human 
rights standards through public interest media campaigns and civic engagement. 
(Juma 2008:16). 
 
(See appendix 1 for a full account of activities undertaken by the EMRC) 
 
A number of observers, especially the ones based in Kenya had anticipated Kibaki’s 
defeat. “Many observers, including key President Mwai Kibaki advisors, acknowledged 
that President Kibaki and his party would lose in December.” (Dagne 2008: 2). This 
prediction however, was proven incorrect when the results were released. Kibaki was 
declared the winner of the 2007 elections. “In the presidential race, the incumbent, Mwai 
Kibaki, defended his seat on a Party of National Unity (PNU) ticket against Raila Odinga 
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of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), Kalonzo Musyoka of ODM-Kenya, and 
six other presidential hopefuls.”(Lynch 2008: 541)  
 
3.7.1  ECK’s Findings 
Below is a table showing the official National results  
 
Table 3 Electoral Commission of Kenya: Official Nation Results 
 
Source: (RescueKenya: 2008)  
 
Since the constitution requires a presidential candidate to meet certain constitutional 
requirements in order to become president, president Kibaki according to the ECK 
seemed to have met all the requirements demanded by Kenya’s Electoral rules. There are 
three main requirements set out by Kenya’s Electoral rules to become president. Namely: 
 
1. The candidate must win the most  votes in a nation-wide count 
2. The candidate must secure at least 25% of the vote in five of any eight provinces 
3. The presidential victor must also win the parliamentary seat in their own 
constituency. (Gibson and Long 2009:2) 
 
Since the elections of 2007 were monitored and run by the ECK, in justifying Kibaki’s 
victory, according to Gibson and Long (2009:3), ECK reported that, 
 
Kibaki, Odinga, and Musyoka all won parliamentary seats. It also reported that 
Kibaki tallied 225,174 more votes than Odinga, producing a 46.4– 44.1% win. 
Musyoka polled a distant third with 8.9% of the vote. The ECK reported that 
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Kibaki met the 25% threshold in every province except Nyanza, Odinga’s 
homeland; and that Odinga surpassed 25% in all provinces except Central and 
Eastern, Kibaki’s homeland.  
 
3.7.2    Contrary Findings 
As things turned out, however, the ECK’s findings were deceptively unproblematic. 
Firstly, cases of violence were overlooked. According to Gibson and Long (2009:5), 
 
During December 2007–February 2008, Kenya experienced shocking levels of 
post-election hostility: battles between government officers and ODM supporters; 
between members of both main political coalitions; and between various ethnic 
communities, particularly over long- standing land disputes. 
 
 As Owor (2008:114-115) reports:  
 
 In general the proceedings on Election Day went well. Kenyans turned out in 
large numbers to vote, electoral material were supplied well in advance to most 
polling stations and the conduct of the ECK personnel during the voting period 
was exemplary. 
 Essentially, the problem began on 28 December, when results began to trickle in 
from the various constituencies. By that evening the preliminary results released 
by the ECK revealed a 1 million vote gap between the ODM-Kenya candidate, 
Raila Odinga, and the PNU candidate, sitting President Mwai Kibaki. 
 Then things began to go wrong 
 Returning officers covering areas regarded as Kibaki strongholds 
disappeared, causing delays in the transmission of results from Central and 
Eastern Provinces. 
 When the results from Central and Eastern provinces were finally released 
there were clear disparities between the provisional results at the polling 
station and the official results contained in the statutory forms at the ECK 
national tallying centers. 
 Other abnormalities included the submission of photocopied results 
contrary to the legal requirements, the absence of the signatures of 
presiding officers and party agents and of the ECK stamp that was crucial 
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to authenticating the documents, and the correction of results that revealed 
discrepancies, for example, in areas that reflected a turnout of more that 
100%. 
 As a consequence the final results released by the ECK on 30 December in 
response to pressure from both the PNU and the ODM-K revealed that 
President Kibaki had won with 4,5 million votes against Raila’s 4,3 
Million. 
 Within an hour after the ECK’s announcement President Kibaki was 
sworn in at State House, Nairobi, for a second five-year term. Within 
minutes fighting and mass protests broke out in different parts of the 
country, with the majority denouncing the results.  
 
Moreover, Juma notes that,  
 
Generally, there was violence throughout the pre-election period, albeit incidental. 
Incidences of political violence reported to the EMRC totaled 72, with Central 
province leading with 19 cases of violence. These incidences of violence were in 
the most part incited by politicians. (Juma 2008: 24). 
 


















Source (Juma 2008:24) 
 
Secondly, the EU Observation mission reported that 
 
By 5 January 2008, six days after the official announcement of the results, the EU 
EOM was informed by ECK officials that the ECK had still not received the 
original result forms and supporting documentation from more than 20 
constituencies. Serious inconsistencies and anomalies were identified in various 
constituency results as announced by the ECK. For example, in Molo (Rift Valley 
Province) and Kieni (Central Province), there were significant differences 
between presidential election results reported by EU EOM observers at the 
constituency level and the results announced by the ECK. (European Union 
Election Observation Mission 2008:33) 
 
In general, the ECK’s strategic omissions undermined confidence in the vote which in 
turn produced widespread protest and violence (Gibson and Long 2009:5).  
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To be sure, recent reports noted significant managerial failures. A 2008 final 
report by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), for instance, 
cites numerous shortcomings of the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK), the 
management body responsible for the administration of elections. The report 
highlights substantial problems with the independence of the ECK and cites a 
blatant disregard for constitutional law in the executive’s appointment of ECK 
commissioners. (McGee 2008:17) 
 
Accordingly, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) described the 
ECK as having “weak accountability mechanism, poor capacity for maintaining the 
voters register and weak organizational structure” (International Foundation for Electoral 
Systems 2008:17). This was confirmed by a senior member of the ECK, Jack Tumwa, 
who conceded that “Although all the parties had breached election regulation during the 
primaries, the ECK lacked the machinery and personnel to enforce security and curb 
bribing” (Kwayera 2008: 22). In short when the results were announced nationally they 
failed to correspond with tallies recorded at the local polling station. 
 
Significantly, McGee (2008:18) argues that “In fact, much of the failure in the actual 
execution of the election was deliberately undertaken to either maintain power (by 
Kibaki’s incumbent government) or secure it (by Odinga’s opposition front)”. A Kenyan 
(living in South Africa) summed up the atmosphere of suspicion and distrust:  
 
As Kenyans we want change. We recognize Raila Odinga as our president. We do 
not recognize Kibaki – he’s a thief. He has stolen the election and that is the 
reason why there is violence in the country. The Kikuyu are greedy people. They 
believe in stealing and not going to school. They are mostly the crime promoters, 
with the majority of them in jail. (Olo quoted in Mail and Guardian 11-17 January 
2008, p. 11) 
 
The monopolization of national resources by a particular ethnic group generates socio-
economic inequalities, and ultimately, generates a correspondence between ethnic and 
class antagonism. Warah (2008:13) sums up socio-economic disparities as follows: 
 
Kenya is one of the most unequal societies in the world. Ten percent of the 
country’s 35 million people control 42 percent of the nation’s wealth, leaving 
nearly half the population to subsist below the poverty line. Inequalities within 
cities such as Nairobi are stark- resident of the capital’s ethnically diverse slums, 
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rated as the biggest and most deprived slums in the world, service some of the 
wealthiest homes and neighborhoods in Africa.  
 
 McGee (2008:18) highlights the ethnic problematic:  
 
The violence that erupted in Kenya was…a political matter of ethnicity and 
representation. While enhancing administrative procedures can improve electoral 
efficiency and curb the possibility of violence, without a fundamental re-
examination of the manner in which the electoral system can yield better 
representation, the root problem will remain. 
.  
As succinctly put in 2008 in the preamble to ‘Agreement on the Principles of Partnership 
of the Coalition Government’, "there is a crisis in this country".  The next chapter 
investigates the attempt to resolve this crisis, and compares conflict resolution efforts in 














CHAPTER FOUR  
THE POWER –SHARING AGREEMENT AND CONSOCIATIONAL 
ELEMENTS IN KENYA 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter will focus mainly on the description of the power-sharing agreement of 2008 
and the application of consociationalism in Kenya; precisely, it seeks to address the 
following questions, what led to the power sharing agreement? Who was involved in the 
mediation efforts towards the power-sharing agreement? What is the nature of the power-
sharing agreement? What is the significance of the National Accord and Reconciliation 
Act 2008? Moreover, in an attempt to elucidate the applicability of consociational 
formula in Kenya’s democracy, the chapter will apply and test some of the elements of 
consociationalism to the case of Kenya. It shall also compare and analyze the National 
Accord and Reconciliation Act of 2008 against the consociational ‘ideal model’.  
 
4.2  Mediation Efforts Towards Power-Sharing. 
Initially, Kenya’s mediation efforts were not easy to execute. This is because mediators 
found it hard to bring the two rivals together in search of a peace agreement. Much of the 
difficulty came from Odinga’s side which was reluctant to comply with the agreement 
without clear assurance from the international community that Kibaki will not eventually 
turn against him on the power-sharing deal as it was previous elections.  As (Dagne 
2008:8) put it, 
 
International efforts to bring a negotiated settlement failed in the initial phase of 
the crisis. The African Union, the Kenyans, and the European Union all 
encouraged a power-sharing arrangement between Odinga and President Kibaki. 
Odinga, while willing to negotiate with Kibaki, was reluctant to agree to a deal 
without international guarantees. Kibaki was elected president in 2002 largely due 
to strong support from Odinga and current opposition leaders. As part of the 
coalition agreement, Odinga was to become prime minister in the Kibaki 
government, although Kibaki reportedly reneged in that agreement. 
 
Initially, the President of the African Union (AU) John Kufour of Ghana was 
unsuccessful in bringing the two rivals to the negotiating table. However, the mediation 
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efforts in Kenya’s conflict received solid support from the United Nation’s former 
Secretary General– Kofi Annan who actively involved himself to ensure that the two 
parties eventually arrived at a peace agreement. Moreover, the African Union (AU) 
supported Annan’s mediation. Thus, the consensus to begin mediation within an African 
framework was quickly endorsed by the AU. Annan was also influential with the 
establishment of a seven member Independent Review Commission which was to be part 
of the Kenyan election and was to be headed by the retired South African Judge Johann 
Kriegler. “Specifically, the Kriegler Commission was mandated to examine all aspects of 
the controversial 2007 presidential poll through consultations with officials of the ECK, 
election observers, politicians, and citizens” (Murithi 2009:5). Some of the 
responsibilities of the Kriegler Commission were to review “the organization and conduct 
of the 2007 elections, extending from civic and voter education and registration through 
polling, logistics, security, vote-counting and tabulation to results-processing and dispute 
resolution” (Murithi 2009:5).  
 
The Commission was also tasked with assessing the independence of the structure and 
composition of the ECK, and to also contribute towards improving future elections in 
Kenya. As Horowitz (2008:9) puts it, 
 
Given the bitterness and distrust that existed at the start of the negotiations, the 
fact that a deal was reached is a credit to Annan’s skillful management of the 
process… [T]he personal dedication and adroit management of the lead mediator, 
Annan, was of considerable importance in maintaining progress. Early on Annan 
managed to end the acrimonious war of words that was being waged between the 
two sides in the media by demanding that both sides stop airing their grievances 
to the press. At a critical point, Annan also sequestered the entire negotiations 
process for several days in Tsavo, one of Kenya’s wildlife preserves, to remove 
the process from the limelight in Nairobi, the nation’s capital. Finally, in the last 
stages, when the negotiations were stalled over key details, Annan bypassed the 
negotiation teams appointed by each party and appealed directly to the principals, 
the heads of the two parties. 
 
According to Juma, there are four contributing factors to a successful mediation, and thus 
the final signing of the National Accord.  
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First was a clear framework of mediation within the ambit of the AU which was 
identified early in the crisis, within the second week of the violence, and around 
which support and momentum grew over time. Accepted by both sides of the 
conflict, this mechanism enjoyed legitimacy and hence became a rallying point 
for all actors interested in resolving the crisis. (Juma 2009:408) 
 
In other words, the two leaders or party rivals would have not agreed to the deal if the 
mediation framework was unclear. Also, having the AU coming up with such a 
framework gave confidence to the two rivals and contributed towards their willingness to 
cooperate.  Another reason, as Juma (2009:408) puts it “Second was the role of Kenyan 
stakeholders in mounting and sustaining pressure on both the mediating team and parties 
to the conflict to return Kenya to peace, mobilizing across party lines”. Most Kenyans 
had seen the impact of the dispute between the two leaders and thus they also offered a 
contribution towards the solution.  
 
Most of them put pressure not only towards the mediating team but also to their 
leaders. Kenyans from various constituencies engaged in the peace process from 
start to beyond the signing of the accord. In many ways, this translated into local 
ownership and identification with the peace process and built a constituency of 
support around it. (Juma 2009:408) 
 
Thirdly, without the character of the team, the mediation would have had little chance of 
success. The mediating team received not only respect in Kenya during their attempt to 
resolve the dispute, but also international recognition. This in turn raised confidence of 
many Kenyans. As Juma (2009:408) observes “their being African [the mediation team] 
diminished any resistance that could have been associated with Western or other external 
influence on the Kenyan process”.  
 
4.3 Power-sharing Agreement 2008 
At the outset, it is important to note though, that debates on the implementation of the 
power-sharing deal had been a topic of discussion and consideration for many years in 
Kenya. Horowitz (2008:6) asserts that, “The post-election violence in 2008 was the 
catalyst for a power-sharing deal. But debates about power-sharing in Kenya predate the 
2008 deal by several decades.” Thus, the power-sharing deal of 2008 was a continuation 
of past efforts in Kenya.  
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In March 2008, a power sharing deal was reached between the two rival political parties, 
respectively led by Kibaki and Odinga.  “The agreement, which calls for a new coalition 
government, was known as the National Accord and Reconciliation Act of 2008 and was 
unanimously passed by the Parliament” ( Kwaja 2009:43). Onyango in (Kwaja 2009:43) 
states that, under this peace agreement, 40 ministers were named as cabinet together with 
50 assistant ministers. This faction of politicians was also referred to as a “peace cabinet” 
(Onyango 2008).5   
 
During the course of the negotiations, the two sides were threatening to sabotage the 
process. This was due to demands that were advanced by the ODM with which the PNU 
disagreed. “First  was the creation of the Prime Ministerial post who would be the Head 
of Government and who would have powers to appoint and remove government officers, 
including cabinet members” (Horowitz 2008:8). Secondly, the ODM demanded the equal 
division of cabinet portfolios and that the two sides must share high ranking profile 
ministries such as the Interior and Finance. “Thirdly, ODM called for proportionality of 
all levels of government” (Horowitz 2008:8). The entrenching of the deal in the 
constitution was ODM’s last demand. On the contrary, the PNU insisted on that the 
President remain the Head of Government “and retain the authority to determine the 
composition of the cabinet. The Prime Minister position would oversee the ministries but 
would not have executive functions related to hiring or firing.” (Horowitz 2008:8) 
 
It was not easy for both parties to reach a consensus on the deal, and since parties were 
coming up with their own demands, some provisions were agreed upon but some were 




5 For a description of the National Accord and Reconciliation Act and the Agreement on the Principles of partnership 
of the coalition government see (Appendix 2).  
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Table 4 Provisions of the Power-Sharing Agreement  
 
Source: Horowitz (2008:9) 
 
 
4.4 The Constitutional Referendum 2010, Leading to the Kenyan Constitution of 
2010 
It is worth noting that (in August 2010) both Kibaki and Odinga backed in principle a 
new constitution. Divided into two campaigns, the “Yes” campaign – seeking to win the 
referendum - and the “No” campaign - against the proposed new constitution - Kenyans 
were to vote either for or against the new constitution which intended to provide a 
peaceful resolution, not least to ethnic disputes. According to the Economist (July 29 
2010), “The referendum on a comprehensive new constitution… [I]s being hailed as a big 
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step towards overhauling Kenya’s creaking political system and giving people a better 
chance of peaceful reform”6.   
The Economist-July 29 2010 further states that,  
 
The proposed constitution provides for an overhaul of the executive, legislature 
and judiciary, together with a measure of devolution to the regions. The country 
will still be ruled by an executive president, but he (there is no prospect yet of a 
she) will be constrained by checks and balances, and parliament will vet key 
appointments that had previously been made by presidential fiat. President and 
parliament will have fixed terms, with elections every five years. To win the top 
job, a candidate will have to win support from across Kenya’s 40-plus recognized 
ethnic groups by winning at least half of all votes cast and at least a quarter of 
them in more than half of the 47 newly demarcated counties. 
 
The proposed constitution also provided a number of gains for both women and children, 
some of the provision in the constitution include issues of violence against women and 
children, discrimination of women, the protection of matrimonial property during and 
after marriage and the inheritance of land by women.  
 
The constitution was accepted by more than 4.1 million voters, or 67 percent of about 6.2 
million votes that have been counted, according to initial commission data broadcast by 
NTV, an independent television station based in Nairobi, Kenya’s capital. The country 
has about 12.7 million registered voters. (Mcgegor & Ombock 2010 – 5 August)  
The chapter now moves on to consider the extent to which Kenya's new constitution - in 
which the power sharing agreement is embedded in statutory form - contains 
consociational elements. 
 
4.5     Four Elements Of Consociationalism In Kenya 
First and foremost, it should be noted that,  
                                                            




The most important method of consociational government – the grand coalition in 
one form or another is complemented by three secondary instruments: mutual 
veto, proportional representation and segmented autonomy. All four are closely 
related to each other, and they entail deviations from pure majoritarian 
democracy. (Lijphart 1977:36) 
 
4.5.1 Grand Coalition 
Grand coalition (also known as executive power-sharing) is one of the main elements of 
the consociational model in which each of the main communities share executive power 
in an executive chosen in accordance with representation as the main principle of 
democratic governance. Helms (2006:47) refers to a grand coalition as “the strong power-
sharing character of public policy-making, [w]hich is largely a result of the exceptionally 
numerous and powerful institutional checks and balances”. There are many forms of 
grand coalition government.  The usual grand coalition entails the inclusivity of 
linguistic, ethnic and religious parties. Other possibilities could be “the formation of 
grand governing coalitions in sites other than the cabinet, such as the Dutch pattern of 
permanent or ad hoc "grand" councils or committees with much greater influence than 
their formal advisory role” (Lijphart 1996:259).  
 
In another form, the grand coalition is defined precisely in a predetermined fashion that is 
intended to be a representation of linguistic and other groups. Lijphart (1996: 259) makes 
an example of the Belgium cabinets which “have rarely been coalitions of all significant 
parties, but they have been ethnically "grand" because of the constitutional rule that 
cabinets must consist of equal numbers of Dutch-speakers and French-speakers. Lastly, a 
government of grand coalition may entail “neither the cabinets nor parties” (Lijphart 
1996:259); instead top government positions are specified according to ethnic and 
religious groups. Such government positions may include: the Presidency, Prime 
Ministership and assembly speakership. Grand coalition is usually formed during times of 
crisis and is usually strengthened also during these times. Lijphart (1997:29) states, 
“Grand Coalitions have achieved unity and stability during critical transitional periods by 
stilling partisan passions and strengthening consensus”. 
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Kenya’s case seems to add even greater variety, since its grand coalition is formed along 
party lines.  Another problematic is that, although Kenya’s main parties are not strictly 
speaking ‘ethnic’, they are informed by a sense of ethnic identity. Yet, the Kenyan 
constitution condemns the foundation of political parties on ethnic basis. Section 91 (2) 
(a) of the constitution of the Republic of Kenya states: “A political party shall not be 
founded on a religious, linguistic, racial, ethnic, gender or regional basis or seek to 
engage in advocacy of hatred on any such basis7.”  
 
Looked at from a consociational angle, the Kenyan case is rather difficult to define. In 
Kenya, the grand coalition entails the distribution of top government offices to specific 
political parties which draws much of their membership from discrete ethnic groups. For 
example, the coalition cabinet has its ministries distributed along party and therefore, by 
inference, ethnic lines. The ministry of Defense, for instance, has its Minister Yusuf Haji 
from the PNU, its Assistant Minister David Musila from ODM-K and another Assistant 
Minister Joseph Nkaisserry from the ODM party. 
 
Nonetheless, commenting on Kenya’s ethnic diversity and the 2008 agreement, Chege 
2008:126) states,  
 
The political tools used to end the conflict are well known. They include a “grand 
coalition government” of all major parties and leaders; “power sharing” between 
ethnic-based factions; and allocation of executive positions so that all major 
groups are fairly represented. Such practices represent important elements of the 
“power-sharing” or “consensus” model of democracy that Arend Lijphart 
prescribes for conflict-prone plural societies like Kenya. 
 
Accordning to Chege, therefore, a consociational model would have been appropriate in 
the Kenyan case. Yet, as this chapter has already suggested, Kenya deviates from this 
model.8  
                                                            
7 The constitution of the Republic of Kenya 2010, section 91, clause 2(a)  
8 For more details on the distribution of ministerial portfolio along party lines see Appendix 4 (The grand coalition 
cabinet) 
  66
Furthermore, Clause 4 (3) of the Description of the National Accord and Reconciliation 
Act states that “The composition of the coalition government shall at all times reflect the 
relative parliamentary strengths of the respective parties and shall at all time take into 
account the principle of portfolio balance”. Power sharing is also seen prominently from 
the two leaders who were contesting for the presidential post (Raila Odinga and Mwai 
Kibaki) , to avoid further disputes, Kenya created a Prime Ministerial post with other 
Deputy Ministerial posts which were mainly intended to bring peace and cooperation 
among the two competing leaders. As entrenched in Section 15A of the Constitution of 
the Republic of Kenya  
15A.  (1) There shall be a Prime Minister of the Government of Kenya. 
(2) There shall be two Deputy Prime Ministers of the Government of 
Kenya. 
(3) Parliament may, by an Act of Parliament and notwithstanding any 
other provision of this Constitution, provide for-                  
(a) the appointment and termination of office of the Prime Minister, 
Deputy Prime Ministers and Ministers; 
(b) the functions and powers of the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime 
Ministers; 
 (c) the establishment of a coalition Government; 
 (d) any other matter incidental to or connected with the foregoing.9 
 
Considering that all members of government must also be elected Members of 
Parliament, a comment made by Berg-Schlosser in 1985 still holds true: “not all members 
of government are necessarily those which would have been put forward by the majority 
of their respective ethnic groups” (Berg Schlosser 1985:100), For example,  
Yet the constitution of the Republic of Kenya states that Parliament shall enact legislation 
to promote the representation in parliament of -  
(a) women; 
(b) person with disabilities; 
                                                            
9 The Constitution of the Republic of Kenya 1963 (as Amended in 2008) 
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(c) youth; 
(d) ethnic and other minorities; and  
(e) Marginalized communities10.  
 
 Thus, the formation of a grand Coalition dominated by parties informed by the identities 
of ethnic majorities is against the spirit of the constitution which contains consociational 
requirements. In terms of proportional representation, however, as we shall see, the same 
does not necessarily hold true of the Kenyan parliament. 
 
4.5.2 Proportional Representation  
In consociational theory, this element can be understood as the basic standard of political 
representation, public service appointments and allocation of public funds. The main 
purpose of proportional representation “is to enable government decisions to be 
influenced according to the approximate numerical strength of the most important social 
groups and to allow civil service appointments and public financial resources to be 
allocated according to the same principle”. (Berg Schlosser 1985:101) Moreover, Lewis 
(1965:79) argues that “One of the advantages of proportional representation is that it 
tends to promote coalition government. This is a frequent, but not necessary outcome”. 
 
In Kenya, however, members of parliament are voted directly from their constituencies. 
A system of direct and simple majority vote in single-member constituencies is used. 
Thus Kenya has a Plurality-majority system and a majoritarian democracy. This kind of 
system “gives more emphasis to local representation via the use of small, single-member 
electoral districts than to proportionality. Amongst such systems are plurality (first-past-
the-post), runoff, block and alternative vote systems” (Reilly 2003).  
That said, Lijphart (1996:261) the ‘father’ of consociationalism, does not believe that a 
plurality-electoral majority system necessarily disfavors geographically concentrated 
minorities. Here it is worth noting that Kenya’s minorities are regionally based. Kenya 
has preserved the geographical separation of the main areas of ethnic settlements to a 
                                                            
10 The constitution of the Republic of Kenya 2010, section 100 
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very large extent. Given this degree of geographical demarcation and social 
segmentation, it can be argued that Kenya’s Parliament is organized along relatively 
proportional lines. “Elections for the seats in Parliament provided for under Articles 97 
(1) (c) and 98 (1) (b), (c) and (d), and for the members of county assemblies under177 (1) 
(b) and (c), shall be on the basis of proportional representation by use of party lists”11.  
 
It, however, cannot be argued that there is any significant element of federalism in 
Kenya, which is constitutionally a unitary state, meaning that Kenya’s regions do not 
have their autonomy. Instead, by way of compromise, Kenya’s electoral boundaries 
reflect (at least in principal) the ethnic diversity of Kenyan people. According to the 
constitution:  
 
 The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission shall be responsible for 
the conduct and supervision of elections for seats provided for under clause (1) 
and shall ensure that— c) except in the case of county assembly seats, each party 
list reflects the regional and ethnic diversity of the people of Kenya12. 
 The composition of the national executive shall reflect the regional and ethnic 
diversity of the people of Kenya13. 
 The composition of the command of the Defence Forces shall reflect the regional 
and ethnic diversity of the people of Kenya14. 
 The composition of the National Police Service shall reflect the regional and 




11 The constitution of the Republic of Kenya 2010, section 90, clause 1  
12 The constitution of the Republic of Kenya  2010, section 90, clause 2(C) 
13 The constitution of the Republic of Kenya 2010, section 130, clause 2 
14 The constitution of the Republic of Kenya 2010, section 241, clause 4 
15 The constitution of the Republic of Kenya 2010, section 246, clause 4 
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According to the constitution, proportional representation also applies to the general 
allocation of portfolios, As indicated in the National Accord and Reconciliation Act 
Clause 4 (3) “The composition of the coalition government shall at all times reflect the 
relative parliamentary strengths of the respective parties and shall at all times take into 
account the principle of portfolio balance”. However, in the power-sharing agreement of 
2008, the two main parties did not agree to a fixed equality of representation among 
different groups. They merely agreed that post should be shared evenly by the two main 
political parties and this only applies to cabinet positions and top administration posts.  
In a nutshell, in regard to both the composition of the Grand Coalition and the limited 
extent to which the principle of proportional representation has been applied, power-
sharing in Kenya is more a matter of sharing power between two dominant parties and 
their leaders than it is about securing the representation and welfare of minority groups, 
ethnic or otherwise.  
 
4.5.3 Segmental Autonomy  
Segmental autonomy is also known as self-government in which each group enjoys some 
significant measure of autonomy, particularly in the area of cultural concerns. This 
chapter will now look closely at the consociational principle of segmental autonomy.  
 
Lijphart (1977:41) defines this element as “rule by the minority over itself in the area of 
the minority’s exclusive concern”.  Some of the features that distinguish these groups are 
language, religion and cultural practices. Lijphart (1996: 260) states that, 
 
Cultural autonomy for religious and linguistics groups has taken three forms in 
power-sharing democracies. (1) federal arrangements in which state and 
linguistic boundaries largely coincide, thus providing a high degree of linguistic 
autonomy, as in Switzerland, Belgium, and Czecho-Slovakia; (2) the right of 
religious and linguistic minorities to establish and administer their own 
autonomous schools, fully supported by public funds, as in Belgium and the 
Netherlands; and (3) separate "personal laws-concerning marriage, divorce, 
custody and adoption of children, and inheritance- for religious minorities, as in 
Lebanon and Cyprus. 
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We have already established that Kenya is a unitary state. The question therefore is one 
of devolution. How much autonomy, if any, has been devolved to regions with distinctive 
languages, cultures and/ or religion of their own? As noted above, Kenya has preserved 
the geographical separation of ethnicities, at any rate, in the rural areas.  For example, the 
North Eastern Province is dominated mostly by Somali-speaking people; the Rift Valley 
by the Kalenjins; the Central Province by the Kikuyu; and the Nyanza Province by the 
Luo. It is only a few provinces that have a mixture of different ethnic groups. According 
to the constitution of the Republic of Kenya,  
 
(1) Every person has the right to use the language, and to participate in the 
cultural life, of the person’s choice. 
(2) A person belonging to a cultural or linguistic community has the right, with 
other members of that community— 
(a) to enjoy the person’s culture and use the person’s language; or 
(b) to form, join and maintain cultural and linguistic associations and 
other organs of civil society. 
(3) A person shall not compel another person to perform, observe or undergo 
any cultural practice or rite16. 
 
Note, however, that the constitution does not refer to regional-cultural autonomy. Instead, 
the constitution refers to ‘devolution’ (Ghai, Y & Ghai,J,. 2010) There will be 47 
counties, each with a county assembly. County votes will elect their own assemblies and 
governors who, in turn, will appoint an executive committee, which will implement the 
policies of the committee. Arguably, devolution will be a major step forward in the 
empowerment of geographically distinctive ethnic group, and thus will approximate to a 
consociational model. However, as Ghai (2010) points out, devolution will come into 
effect only after the next Kenyan election, and is to be phased in gradually. Ghai (2010) 
also notes that “minorities are to be proportionally represented in county assemblies and 
the executive”. Granted, this system has yet to be implemented. Hopefully, however, it 
                                                            
16 The constitution of the Republic of Kenya 2010, section 44 (1)(2)(3) 
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will prove to be a significant shift towards a significant aspect of the consociational ‘ideal 
model’.  
 
4.5.4 Minority Veto or Mutual Veto 
 
The final key element of consociationalism is minority veto. Lijphart in (Lemarchand 
2006:3) describes minority veto as “the ultimate weapon that minorities need to protect 
their vital interests and which works best when it is not used too often and only with 
regard to issues of fundamental importance”. A good example of informal veto is found 
in Indian politics in the 1965 agreement, in which Lijphart (1996:261) states,  
 
The informal veto in Indian politics is the 1965 agreement by the central 
government that Hindi would not be made the exclusive official language without 
the concurrent approval of the major non-Hindi speaking regions, in effect giving 
a veto to the southern states, which had opposed dropping English as a language 
of administration. The provision works best if the minority veto does not have to 
be used very often in order to protect minority rights and autonomy, and this has 
been the case in India. 
 
The application of the minority veto element is often not formalized in power-sharing 
democracies, but rather “power-sharing democracy usually consists of merely an 
informal understanding that minorities can effectively protect their autonomy by blocking 
any attempts to eliminate or reduce it” (Lijphart 1996:261). According to Berg-Schlosser, 
minority veto “serves to protect vital minority interest even against majority decision… 
[T]he fact that this veto is mutual usually prevents its overuse, a problem which, in the 
long-run, would otherwise lead to immobilism and deadlock” (1985:103).  
 
In Kenya, there has not been formal institutionalization of this consociational element in 
any of the constitutions, including the most recent constitution. However, the history of 
Post Colonial Kenya indicates the presence of an informal minority veto in regard to land 
rights in traditional areas of settlement (Berg-Schlosser 1985:103), notably in Busia and 
Teso district (Miguel and Gugerty 2005). The inhabitants of these districts are believed to 
have historically acquired land rights and thus deserve to protect themselves from 
majority decisions. Arguably, a second instance of informal minority veto can be found 
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in the distinction successive Kenyan constitution (including the 2010 constitution) have 
made between church  and state , along with a commitment to freedom of conscience , 
religion, belief and opinion as fundamental human rights. Given that 66% of Kenyans are 
Christians (Waris 2007: 39). “Muslims qualify numerically as a religious minority group” 
(ibid) in possession of an informal minority veto. However, much the same can be said of 
any country with a constitution that protects freedom of religion.  
 
Taken all round, then, Kenya’s power-sharing agreement and the constitution of 2010 
bear no more than a passing resemblance (if any) to a consociational model. However, if 
the planned devolution appears to empower ethno-regional groups, then there will be at 
least one key consociational element in Kenyan democracy. The final chapter will argue 
that if Kenya’s ruling elite honors the consociational commitment to segmental autonomy 
(in the form of devolving power to the 47 regions) it will be a significant step towards 




















CONCLUSION: KENYA, CONSOCIATIONALISM AND ELITES 
 
“My own view […] is that there are no real conflicts between the people of 
Africa. There are only conflicts between their elites” Amilcar Cabral (quoted in 
Davison, 1994:354) 
 
Emphasizing that Africa is “the world’s most conflict-ridden region” (2004: 297) 
Uzodike makes a convincing case for consociational democracy as distinct from 
majoritarian democracy. Uzodike highlights the colonial contribution to post-colonial 
conflicts in Africa, specifically in relation to the boundaries of colonial states. “It 
mattered little (if at all) to the  metropolitan centers that the new entities were frequently 
made up of societies and cultural groups that either shared few interest or harbored 
abiding historical rivalries or animosities towards each other” (Uzodike 2004:287). 
Referring to the “severe structural segmentation” of many African countries, Uzodike 
makes the position that “the resource-starved African social and political environment 
provides the wrong context for majoritarian experiments at democracy” (Uzodike 
2004:288). Uzodike recommends “power sharing modes of government” [which] “would 
mean that no cultural group would be left out of the political system (Uzodike 2004: 89) 
Citing Lijphart (1977), Uzodike highlights the significance of “a high degree of internal 
autonomy for groups that wish to have it”. He also highlights, as a prerequisite of the 
above, the ability of elites to meet four requirements. Namely,  
 Ability of elites to accommodate the divergent interests and demands of the 
subculture; 
 Ability of elites to transcend cleavages and to join in a common effort with the 
elites of rival subcultures.  
 Elites commitments to the maintenance of the system and to the improvement of 
its cohesion and stability; and  
 The degree of elite understanding of the perils of political fragmentation. 
(Uzodike 2004:301-302).  
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It thus is arguable that the responsibility for implementing consociational solutions to 
ethnic conflicts rests squarely on the shoulders of African elites. This contention is 
supported by Vandeginste’s analysis of problematics embedded in Burundi’s power-
sharing agreement. 
 
Burundi’s Constitution of 18 March 2005 and the many consociational features of 
its current political regime are strongly rooted in the peace process that started in 
June 1998. In a way, also the political resistance against implementing and 
maintaining the consociational power-sharing equilibrium can be explained by 
taking into account the positions of the different political and military actors 
during the peace process. (Vandeginste 2009:71) 
 
She further argues that “the notion of power-sharing mainly referred to the dividing of the 
cake between competing political elites and their networks, in particular the distribution 
of posts […]. (Vandegiste 2009:71). Vandeginste concludes that while in key respect; 
Burindi’s constitution of 2005 follows a consociational ‘ideal model’, “In several 
respects, Burundi’s constitutional and institutional setting stands out as a model of 
consociationalism, even though, in actual political practice, important gaps remain 
between the model and its implementation” (Vandeginste 2009: 74). In the final analysis, 
she attributes the disjuncture between theory and practice to “an unstable scene of ever-
shifting alliances built around the neo-patrimonial interests of their leaders. The 
corporatist foundations and ramifications of classical consociationalism are clearly 
lacking” (Vandeginste 2009:84). 
 
The study concludes that one key aspect of the 2008 power-sharing agreement 
(subsequently embedded in the constitution of 2010) qualifies as authentically 
consociational is the plan to devolve power to the forty-seven counties. As Kagwanja 
puts it, “One of the most revolutionary aspects of the new constitution is the redrawing of 
the political map of Kenya as 47 counties replacing the existing eight provinces as the 
centre-piece of devolution of resources and decision-making to Kenyans at the 
grassroots” (Kagwanja, P., 2010). Kagwanja adds that “This system marks a remarkable 
triumph of ‘developmental devolution’ over the ideology of ethnic federalism (Majimbo) 
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as an idiom of ethnic polarization. However, he sounds a note of warning with regards to 
“post-referendum elite alliances and jostling for 2012 presidential elections”. 
 
If Kenya’s ruling and would-be ruling elite prove incapable of conforming with the four 
requirements as outlined by Uzodike (above), then – as is the case in Burundi- power-
sharing efforts will be deeply compromised and perhaps doomed to failure not by the 
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Appendix 1: Specific activities undertaken by the EMRC during the election of 2007-
2008 
 
a) Recruiting, training and managing a network of election monitors. A total of 117 
monitors were recruited, trained and deployed as 88 constituency-based monitors and 29 
media correspondents; 
b) Assessing adherence of election monitors to the KHRC Code of Conduct for Election-
Monitors in order to affirm their impartiality and commitment to upholding the integrity 
of the electoral process. The Monitors were supervised throughout the electioneering 
period (pre-election and the immediate post-election period) to ensure compliance with 
the Code; 
c) Collecting, collating and verifying information from the field and other sources such as 
reports of other observer groups and media houses; 
d) Entering data, analyzing it and generating cumulative statistics on the nature and types 
of incidents of human rights violations related to the elections. A total of 387 Election 
Monitoring Tools were keyed into the database. 
e) Processing complaints requiring the intervention. The EMRC received numerous 
complaints from monitors through call-ins and e-mails, which were promptly dealt with; 
f) Releasing bulletins and press statements on major incidents or patterns of violations as 
the situation dictated. The EMRC released a bulletin in October 2007 and also wrote 
numerous statements on election-related offences; and, 
g) Working with other election observers, the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK), 










Appendix 2: Text on Power-Sharing Agreement  
 
ACTING TOGETHER FOR KENYA 
 




The crisis triggered by the 2007 disputed presidential elections has brought to the surface 
deep-seated and long-standing divisions within Kenyan society. If left unaddressed, these 
divisions threaten the very existence of Kenya as a unified country. The Kenyan people 
are now looking to their leaders to ensure that their country will not be lost. 
 
Given the current situation, neither side can realistically govern the country without the 
other. There must be real power-sharing to move the country forward and begin the 
healing and reconciliation process. 
 
With this agreement, we are stepping forwarding together, as political leaders, to 
overcome the current crisis and to set the country on a new path. As partners in a 
coalition government, we commit ourselves to work together in good faith as true 
partners, through constant consultation and willingness to compromise. 
 
This agreement is designed to create an environment conducive to such a partnership and 
to build mutual trust and confidence. It is not about creating positions that reward 
individuals. It seeks to enable Kenya's political leaders to look beyond partisan 
considerations with a view to promoting the greater interests of the nation as a whole. It 
provides the means to implement a coherent and far-reaching reform agenda, to address 
the fundamental root causes of recurrent conflict, and to create a better, more secure, 
more prosperous Kenya for all. 
  96
 
To resolve the political crisis, and in the spirit of coalition and partnership, we have 
agreed to enact the National Accord and Reconciliation Act 2008, whose provisions have 
been agreed upon in their entirety by the parties hereto and a draft copy thereof is 
appended hereto. 
 
The key points are: 
 
• There will be a Prime Minister of the Government of Kenya, with authority to 
coordinate and supervise the execution of the functions and affairs of the Government of 
Kenya. 
• The Prime Minister will be an elected member of the National Assembly and the 
parliamentary leader of the largest party in the National Assembly, or of a coalition, if the 
largest party does not command a majority. 
• Each member of the coalition shall nominate one person from the National Assembly to 
be appointed a Deputy Prime Minister. 
• The Cabinet will consist of the President, the Vice-President, the Prime Minister, the 
two Deputy Prime Ministers and the other Ministers. The removal of any Minister of the 
coalition will be subject to consultation and concurrence in writing by the leaders. 
• The Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Ministers can only be removed if the National 
Assembly passes a motion of no confidence with a majority vote. 
• The composition of the coalition government will at all times take into account the 
principle of portfolio balance and will reflect their relative parliamentary strength. 
• The coalition will be dissolved if the Tenth Parliament is dissolved; or if the parties 
agree in writing; or if one coalition partner withdraws from the coalition. 
• The National Accord and Reconciliation Act shall be entrenched in the Constitution. 
 
Having agreed on the critical issues above, we will now take this process to Parliament. It 
will be convened at the earliest moment to enact these agreements. This will be in the 
form of an Act of Parliament and the necessary amendment to the Constitution. 
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We believe by these steps we can together in the spirit of partnership bring peace and 
prosperity back to the people of Kenya who so richly deserve it. 
 
Agreed this date 28 February 2008 
 
Signed by: 
Hon. Raila Odinga, Orange Democratic Party 
 




H.E. Kofi A. Annan, Chairman of the Panel of Eminent African Personalities 
 
H.E. President Jakaya Kikwete, President of the United Republic of Tanzania and 
Chairman of the African Union. 
 
 
The National Accord and Reconciliation Act 2008 
 
Preamble: 
There is a crisis in this country. The Parties have come together in recognition of this 
crisis, and agree that a political solution is required. 
 
Given the disputed elections and the divisions in the Parliament and the country, neither 
side is able to govern without the other. There needs to be real power sharing to move the 
country forward. 
 
A coalition must be a partnership with commitment on both sides to govern together and 
push through a reform agenda for the benefit of all Kenyans. 
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Description of the Act: 
 
An Act of Parliament to provide for the settlement of the disputes arising from the 
presidential elections of 2007, formation of a Coalition Government and Establishment of 
the Offices of Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers and Ministers of the Government 
of Kenya, their functions and various matters connected with and incidental to the 
foregoing. 
 
1. This Act may be cited as the National Accord and Reconciliation Act 2008. 
2. This Act shall come into force upon its publication in the Kenya Gazette which shall 
not be later than 14 days from the date of Assent. 
3. (1) There shall be a Prime Minister of the Government of Kenya and two Deputy 
Prime Ministers who shall be appointed by the President in accordance with this 
section. 
(2) The person to be appointed as Prime Minister shall be an elected member of 
the National Assembly who is the parliamentary leader of - 
(a) the political party that has the largest number of members in the 
National Assembly; or 
(b) a coalition of political parties in the event that the leader of the 
political party that has the largest number of members of the National 
Assembly does not command the majority in the National Assembly. 
(3) Each member of the coalition shall nominate one person from the elected 
members of the National Assembly to be appointed a Deputy Prime Minister. 
4. (1) The Prime Minister: 
a) shall have authority to coordinate and supervise the execution of the 
functions and affairs of the Government of Kenya including those of 
Ministries; 
b) may assign any of the coordination responsibilities of his office to the 
Deputy Prime Ministers, as well as one of them to deputise for him; 
c) shall perform such other duties as may be assigned to him by the 
President or under any written law. 
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  (2) In the formation of the coalition government, the persons to be appointed as  
Ministers and Assistant Ministers from the political parties that are partners in the 
coalition other than the President's party, shall be nominated by the parliamentary 
leader of the party in the coalition. Thereafter there shall be full consultation with 
the President on the appointment of all Ministers. 
(3) The composition of the coalition government shall at all times reflect the 
relative parliamentary strengths of the respective parties and shall at all times take 
into account the principle of portfolio balance. 
(4) The office of the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister shall become 
vacant only if - 
(a) the holder of the office dies, resigns or ceases to be a member of the 
National Assembly otherwise than by reason of the dissolution of 
Parliament; or 
(b) the National Assembly passes a resolution which is supported by a 
majority of all the members of the National Assembly excluding the ex-
officio members and of which not less than seven days notice has been 
given declaring that the National Assembly has no confidence in the Prime 
Minister or Deputy Prime Minister, as the case may be; or 
(c) the coalition is dissolved. 
(5) The removal of any Minister nominated by a parliamentary party of the 
coalition shall be made only after prior consultation and concurrence in writing 
with the leader of that party. 
5. The Cabinet shall consist of the President, the Vice-President, the Prime Minister, the 
two Deputy Prime Ministers and the other Ministers. 
6. The coalition shall stand dissolved if: 
(a) the Tenth Parliament is dissolved; or 
(b) the coalition parties agree in writing; or 
(c) one coalition partner withdraws from the coalition by a resolution of the 
highest decision-making organ of that party in writing. 
  100
7. The prime minister and deputy prime ministers shall be entitled to such salaries, 
allowances, benefits, privileges and emoluments as may be approved by Parliament from 
time to time. 
8. This Act shall cease to apply upon dissolution of the tenth Parliament, if the coalition 

















































































 Appendix 4: The Grand coalition Cabinet 
(All appointments, announces on April 13, 2008) 
    
Source :( Appointments listed in The East African Standard, April 14, 2008. Party 
affiliation accessed at http://www.bunge.go.ke on October 28, 2008) quoted in Horowitz 
(2008:22) 
